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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON HEALTH, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND THE LABOR
MARKET
Lulu Liu, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2017
My dissertation is at the intersection of health economics, development economics, and
labor economics, with an emphasis on the labor market impact of health interventions and
healthcare policies. The first chapter explores the effect of hypertension control on annual
income using data from a randomized controlled trial conducted in rural China. Utilizing the
exposure to the interventions as an instrumental variable for blood pressure levels, we found
that a one standard deviation decrease in systolic blood pressure can significantly increase
annual income by 4.8%. The second chapter investigates the impact of health insurance on
entrepreneurs and estimates the alleviation of job lock following a 2009 nationwide healthcare
reform—the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) program. Using 2000-2011
data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey and a difference-in-differences approach
with propensity score weighting, we find that URBMI increases self-employment rate by
5.4% for the overall population. The third chapter analyzes the effect of a major policy
change in China—the 2007 Property Rights Law that improved the access to credit. I found
evidence that the 2007 Property Rights Law promotes entrepreneurship as measured by the
number of owner-mangers in the economy, but has little impact on necessity entrepreneurs.
Keywords: Health Economics; Development Economics; Labor Economics; China.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
My research is at the intersection of health economics, development economics, and la-
bor economics, with an emphasis on the labor market impact of health interventions and
healthcare policies. My dissertation mobilizes information on one of the world’s largest
economies—China—to grapple with complex issues that deservedly absorb the attention of
many economists: health care, health insurance, and entrepreneurship.
The first chapter of my thesis, “The Effects of Lowering Blood Pressure on Income:
Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial in Rural China,” explores the effect of hy-
pertension control on annual income. Health interventions can result in social welfare gains
through improvement in both physical well-being and income. Previous literature encounters
difficulties in estimating the causal impact due to the endogeneity of health and the preva-
lence of employment contracts that limit income flexibility. Studying hypertensive farmers
in rural China who need to perform un-mechanized farm work to make a living creates
an unusually tight link between health, productivity, and income that might be difficult to
replicate in high-income societies. Hypertension is one of the most prevalent chronic diseases
in the world, but little is known about the impact of high blood pressure on labor market
outcomes. This paper exploits data from a randomized controlled trial designed to improve
hypertension management in a rural county in southwest China and utilizes the exposure
to the interventions as an instrumental variable for blood pressure levels. We find that a
one standard deviation decrease in systolic blood pressure can significantly increase annual
income by 4.8%, a sizable effect compared to the 2% annual increase in the control group.
There is also evidence that the increase in income comes from rising labor productivity,
rather than the elongation of working hours. Cost-benefit analysis shows that the gain from
improved income is much larger than the cost of the interventions, suggesting that alleviating
1
hypertension can result in large welfare gains.
Health insurance is also an important labor market consideration. Employer-provided
health insurance can lower job mobility and deter entrepreneurship, creating “job lock.”
However, health insurance is usually endogenous, making it difficult to evaluate this barrier.
In my second chapter, “Does Non-Employment Based Health Insurance Alleviate Job Lock?
Evidence from a Policy Experiment in Urban China,” my co-author Yuting Zhang and I in-
vestigate the impact of health insurance on entrepreneurs and estimate the alleviation of job
lock following a 2009 nationwide healthcare reform—the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insur-
ance (URBMI) program. URBMI offers health insurance to about 271 million urban residents
without formal employment, many of whom were previously uninsured. We hypothesize that
this new insurance option, which does not depend on formal employment, may promote en-
trepreneurship because it provides additional benefit out of the normal workplace. Using
2000-2011 data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey and a difference-in-differences
approach with propensity score weighting, we find that URBMI increases self-employment
rate by 5.4% for the overall population, eliminating the entrepreneurship barrier entirely.
This effect is heterogeneous among different sub-populations: strong for individuals with
up to 12 years of schooling and workers between 30 and 50 years old, but minimal for the
remaining workers.
Besides health insurance, would-be entrepreneurs face many other obstacles. My third
dissertation chapter, titled “Entrepreneurship or Necessity? Credit Constraint and Self-
Employment in China,” analyzes the affect of a major policy change in China—the 2007
Property Rights Law that improved the access to credit. I examine its impact on the for-
mation of different types of self-employment—opportunity entrepreneurship and necessity
entrepreneurship. Opportunity entrepreneurs are owner-managers who exploit business op-
portunities, hire workers, and promote overall economic activity. Necessity entrepreneurs
are individuals who turn to self-employment as a last resort. I construct a structural model
that contains both liquidity constraints and employee hiring choices to make predictions on
the corresponding self-employment rates after a relaxation of credit constraints. I test the
predictions and find preliminary evidence that the 2007 Property Rights Law promotes en-
trepreneurship as measured by the number of owner-mangers in the economy, but has little
2
impact on necessity entrepreneurs.
The widely recognized links between health, productivity, and economic growth make
it essential to critically analyze healthcare systems and their impact on labor markets. My
research, centered on examining health interventions and health insurance through the lens
of economic models and statistical theories, does just this. Studying the interventions and
national policy changes in China reveals implications that are applicable to many other
countries and opens the door to more insightful cross-institutional analyses.
3
2.0 THE EFFECTS OF LOWERING BLOOD PRESSURE ON INCOME:
EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL IN RURAL
CHINA
This chapter is coauthored with Wenxi Tang, Yan Zhang, Liang Zhang, and Yuting Zhang.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Besides inflicting pain, poor health can also affect labor productivity and working hours, and
therefore affect earnings. Health interventions, which improve both physical well-being and
income, can result in social welfare gains. Understanding the causal relationship between
health and income can better inform future health policies. There are two main challenges in
estimating this causal relationship: first, because health is endogenous, any correlation found
between health and income may be due to reverse causality or the effect of omitted variables.
For example, healthier people can be more productive, which can lead to higher income; but
productivity is often unobserved. In addition, individuals with higher income can in return
have better access to health insurance and medical treatment and can avoid hazardous jobs,
all of which leads to better health. One common omitted variable is the strenuousness of
the work, which cause higher income and worse health but is hard to measure. Second,
employment contracts often limit the flexible measures of income. Most papers focus on
urban labor market, where wage workers can be sheltered from health shocks due to the
prevalence of employment contracts. Thus there is little evidence in the literature on the
effect of health on income directly, especially in the short run.
In this paper, we address the difficulties encountered by previous literature and study the
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labor market impact of health improvement among patients with high blood pressure. We
exploit data from a randomized controlled trial designed to improve hypertension manage-
ment in a rural county in southwest China. We utilize the exposure to the trial interventions
as an instrumental variable to estimate the causal impact of lowering blood pressure on in-
come. Our sample population consist of farmers who grow corn, tobacco, and other crops
in the fields, harvest the crops, and sell them in local market. Since these farmers need
to perform un-mechanized farm work to make a living, we observe an unusually tight link
between health, productivity, and earnings that might be difficult to replicate in high-income
societies.
High blood pressure is one of the most prevalent chronic diseases in the world and a main
driver of the global burden of cardiovascular diseases. World Health Organization (2009)
has named hypertension as the number one risk factor for mortality, with this disease being
responsible for 13% of deaths globally. In China, for example, the prevalence of hypertension
among adults almost doubled from 18% in 2002 to 34% in 2010 (Hou et al., 2016). Despite
the prevalence of hypertension, little is known about high blood pressure?s impact on labor
market outcomes.
In our data, six towns were randomly assigned into three groups: a control group with
no interventions, group 1 with an integrated care model intervention, and group 2 with
both the integrated care and financial interventions. Both interventions are designed to
improve care delivery and reduce costs for patients with hypertension, and are successful at
hypertension control, as measured by the systolic blood pressure. Thus, the trial provides an
exogenous shock to the blood pressure level and we utilize the exposure to the interventions
as instruments to infer causality between health and income.
Using the instrumental variables approach, we find that lowering blood pressure increases
income: specifically, one standard deviation decrease in systolic blood pressure (9.54 mmHg)
significantly increases income by 4.2% among farmers. Using placebo tests, we show that
this effect is not driven by remittances or government subsidies. We examine the channels
through which hypertension could affect income and find that the increase in income resulted
from an improvement in labor productivity rather than from longer working hours. We also
conduct a cost-benefit analysis showing that the gain from increased income is much larger
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than the cost of the interventions.
The exclusion restriction assumption of the instrumental variables approach require that
both interventions are uncorrelated with the unobservables and only affect patients’ income
by affecting their health. Because two interventions were randomly assigned, the instru-
mental variables are uncorrelated with unobservables like patients’ working hours and work
strenuousness. Moreover, the interventions were targeted on healthcare providers rather
than on patients, so the effect on patients’ income can only come from changes in patients’
health. We address remaining caveats related to the verification of the identification strategy
in Section 2.5.2.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, estimating the causal
effect of health on income is difficult because health is endogenous; our paper utilizes an
instrumental variables approach and data from a randomized controlled trial that enables
us to identify causality. The literature examining the relationship between health and labor
market outcomes mostly focuses on correlation rather than causality, both at the macro level
(Arora, 2001; Weil, 2007) and at the micro level (Bartel and Taubman, 1979). Among the
papers that aim to estimate the causal effect of health on labor market outcomes, some use
a dynamic programming model (Bound et al., 2010), some use panel data and individual
fixed effect (Wagstaff, 2007; Pohl et al., 2014), and others use sudden health events (Halla
and Zweimu¨ller, 2013). They found large impact of health on labor market behavior.
Second, our paper is one of few studies that provides direct empirical evidence on the
effect of health on direct measure of income. Because employment contracts limit the flexible
measure of income, there is little evidence on the direct effect of health on income. The liter-
ature tends to measure income lost by an output decrease due to sickness and disability and
evaluate outcomes such as employee disability days, early retirement, and unemployment.
However, not all diseases can be well-characterized simply by absenteeism (Bleakley, 2010),
and a direct measure of productivity—such as income—is more preferable. In our paper, we
focus on rural self-employed farmers who need to perform un-mechanized farm work to make
a living. Thus their income is very responsive to the changes in their physical well-being.
Third, our study is one of the first to measure the effect of health improvement, instead of
health impairment, on income, in low or middle income countries. Most studies on the labor
6
market impact of health focus on developed countries, by studying the incidences of severe
health impairments, such as workplace accidents and road injuries (Dano, 2005; Halla and
Zweimu¨ller, 2013). However, study of health improvement, which has more direct policy
implications, is rarely seen. In this paper, we fill the gaps in the literature by focusing
on rural labor market in a developing country and looking at the effect of hypertension
control on income. It is particularly important to study hypertension, because effective and
relatively inexpensive anti-hypertension treatments have been around for more than 50 years
so potential welfare gains from hypertension interventions can be large.
Fourth, we use both objective and subjective measures of health. Many previous papers
use subjective measures such as self-assessed health status, that are often associated with
errors. Wu (2003) argues that subjective health measures can be confounded, since an
individual may simply feel better physically when the household is financially better off. We
get around this issue by measuring the severity of hypertension with systolic blood pressure,
which is objective and precise. Clinical trials have demonstrated that control of systolic
hypertension decreases the risk of diseases such as heart failure and stroke (Izzo et al., 2000;
Trialists’ Collaboration et al., 2008). In addition, we use a subjective measure—RAND’s
SF36 score—to rule out the possibility that our findings are driven by other improvements
in health besides blood pressure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 introduces the institutional
background and Section 2.3 provides the details of the randomized controlled trial. Section
2.4 presents data and measurements. Section 2.5 illustrates the empirical strategies. Section
2.6 discusses the corresponding results. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 HYPERTENSION AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Our intervention sites are located in Qianjiang county, a rural district in China with a
population of 545,000. It is located 280 kilometers south east of Chongqing, one of China’s
four province-level municipalities (Figure 2.1). Qianjiang has 30 towns, each surrounded
by around 10 villages. Of these towns, 80% are rural, and 91% of the individuals in our
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sample reported that they work in farming. The average annual per capita income for rural
residents was 6,215 RMB (around 1,035 USD) in 2012. Qianjiang is representative of China’s
rural areas in terms of its population size, economic development level, and chronic disease
prevalence (Tang, 2015).
2.2.1 Hypertension: Risk and Management
Hypertension is defined as having a systolic blood pressure above 140 or a diastolic blood
pressure above 90 mmHg as calculated by the averaging of two or more properly measured
readings (Chobanian et al., 2003).
High blood pressure, which affects nearly one billion people worldwide, is a prevalent
public health problem and is the leading risk factor for cardiovascular disease globally (Wu
et al., 2008). In recent years, it has become more of a serious problem in developing countries.
In the middle and low income countries, the overall prevalence rate of hypertension among
the general population is about 32.3% (Sarki et al., 2015). In China, the prevalence of
hypertension among adults almost doubled from 18% in 2002 to 34% in 2010 (Hou et al.,
2016). It now affects over 442 million people in China and is estimated to cause 20% of
deaths in China (Feng et al., 2014).
Uncontrolled hypertension can cause serious damages to the heart and coronary arteries,
and increase the likelihood of heart attack, stroke, kidney disease, disability, and shortened
life expectancy (Stamler, 1998). Aggarwal and Khan (2006) shows that even a slightly
elevated blood pressure can increase the risk of cardiovascular disease. Hypertensive crisis,
systolic blood pressure rising above 180 mmHg, can also cause severe headache, shortness of
breath, and severe anxiety. Ezzati et al. (2005) suggests that high blood pressure accounts for
about 45% of global cardiovascular disease morbidity and mortality. In rural China, because
of poor hypertension management, the rate of uncontrolled blood pressure is much higher
than that in the West, estimated to be 63.4% in 2012 among Chinese with hypertension
(Hou et al., 2016). In our sample, 53.4% individuals have had inpatient stays, 21.0% of
which were hypertension-related.
Treatment of hypertension usually combines nonpharmacologic therapy and anti-hyper-
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tensive drug therapy. Nonpharmacologic therapy is also called lifestyle modification, in-
cluding limiting dietary salt intake, limiting alcohol intake, increasing daily exercise, etc.
Anti-hypertensive drugs can be classified into four categories: diuretics, calcium channel
blockers (CCB), angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitor (ACEI), and angiotensin receptor
blockers (ARB). The anti-hypertensive drugs prescribed by the doctors in our trial came
exclusively from the National Essential Medicine List (2012 edition) released by the China
Food and Drug Administration, and all belong to one of the four categories.1 Multiple stud-
ies have shown that all of the drugs on this list are effective in reducing blood pressure,
and it is the degree of blood pressure reduction, rather than the choice of medication, that
matters the most for the reduction of cardiovascular risk for hypertensive patients (Trialists’
Collaboration et al., 2008). Trialists’ Collaboration et al. (2014) also shows that the benefits
of blood pressure-lowering drugs are proportional to the baseline cardiovascular risk. The
average baseline systolic blood pressure level for the treatment groups is high—145.8 mmHg,
hence the interventions can reduce cardiovascular risk sharply through ensuring medication
adherence.
2.2.2 Usual Care in Rural China: The Three-Tier Healthcare System
Rural residents in China receive care from a village-town-county three-tier health care de-
livery system, corresponding to the three-tier administrative hierarchy (Zhang et al., 2017).
Village level medical care is typically provided by an individual clinician, who sometimes
sets up the clinic at his/her home. The clinician provides simple outpatient care, preventive
care, and health care education to all villagers. The village clinic has a small supply of medi-
cations but often lacks rudimentary medications included in the National Essential Medicine
List. At the town level, there is usually one infirmary that provides both outpatient and
inpatient care. If town hospitals cannot treat the patient’s illness, the patient can choose to
go to hospitals in the county seat depending on his/her financial situation. As one goes up
the three tiers, the health care professionals become more experienced and the services more
1The National Essential Medicine List (2012 edition) includes the following anti-hypertension drugs: Cap-
topril, Enalapril, Valsartan, Sodium Nitroprusside, Magnesium Sulfate, Nitrendipine, Nifedipine, Amlodip-
ine, Bisoprolol, Indapamide, Phentolamine, Compound Reserpine, Compound Hypoensive, and Prazosin.
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expensive.
Most rural residents in China now have health insurance through the New Rural Co-
operative Medical Scheme. Under the current system, most patients can go to county seat
hospitals directly without going through town hospitals, but the inpatient reimbursement
rate is much lower at the county level. For example, in Qianjiang in 2012, the inpatient
policy reimbursement rate was 70% for services provided in the town hospitals and 55% for
those in the county seat hospitals.
2.2.3 Labor Market in Rural Qianjiang
In the six towns in Qianjiang participating in our study, around 70% of the workforce works
in agriculture.2 Among senior residents, this percentage is even higher. In our sample, 90%
reported their occupations to be farmers. They grow crops such as rice, corn, and tobacco,
consume some as daily provision, and sell the rest as retailers on the local market. Thus
their labor income depends entirely on the value of the agricultural products that they sell.
Since they need to work in the fields and sell the products in the market, physical well-being
can be positively related to production and income.
The major agriculture products in Qianjiang are grain (rice, corn, beans, etc.), tobacco,
oil-bearing crops (peanut and rapeseed), and vegetables. In 2012 and 2013, the average
annual production was 249,989 tons of grain, 8,810 tons of tobacco, 15,218 tons of oil-bearing
crops, and 176,822 tons of vegetables. Overall, 33% of the grain, 79% of the vegetables, and
around 80% of the tobacco and oil-bearing crops were sold as commodities on the market.3
For our participants, other forms of income in addition to labor income include pension
and other government subsidies and family support such as remittance from their children
working in the city. However, a large percentage of rural elderly are heavily relied on their
own labor income and continuing to work until they are physically incapable to do so. Davis-
Friedmann (1991) describe this retirement pattern as “ceaseless toil.” Based on the 2009
China Health and Nutrition Survey and the 2008 China Health and Retirement Longitudinal
2This number is calculated using data from The China National Bureau of Statistics (2012).
3All the numbers were calculated using data from Chongqing Bureau of Statistics (2014). The commodity
rate for each product in Qianjiang was not available so I report the average rate for Chongqing instead. The
overall commodity rate in Qianjiang (69.5%) is not very different from the average in Chongqing (63.2%).
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Study, Giles et al. (2011) found that at national average, over 65% of men and 40% of
women still continue to work at the age of 70. The Chongqing Bureau of Statistics (2005)
reported that 50.37% of Chongqing rural residents above 60 years old have labor income as
their major source of income, 42.04% mainly depend on family support, and 4.81% mainly
receive government support. The implementation of the New Rural Social Pension in 2012
can potentially encourage retirement among rural elderly, but the basic pension benefit is
limited and our sample still shows high labor market participation rate.
In summary, for our sample—senior rural farmers—poor health can quickly have an
impact on agricultural production, meaning income is highly dependent on and responsive
to physical well-being.
2.3 INTERVENTIONS
This randomized controlled trial has been registered at the World Health Organization’s
International Clinical Trials Registry Platform (ChiCTR-OOR-14005563) and was funded
by the China Medical Board (Grant # 11-069). Two interventions were implemented: an
integrated care model started in August 2012, and a financial incentive contract model
started in June 2013. Both interventions ended on Jun 30, 2014. Both models aim to
improve hypertension management in rural China, with the integrated care model focusing
on increasing the continuity of health care and adherence to medications and the financial
incentive model focusing on decreasing costs of the operations. Similar models have been
tested in other countries, for example, the Accountable Care Organizations in the United
States, the Integrated Care Pioneers in the U.K., and the Gesundes Kinzigtal model in
Germany.
In the study, six towns were randomly assigned to three groups: two treatment groups
(Group 1 and Group 2) and one control group. Group 1 only received the integrated care
model, and Group 2 received both the integrated care model and the financial incentive
model. The control group retained its usual care. More details of the background and the
interventions can be found in Zhang et al. (2017) and Tang (2015).
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2.4 DATA AND MEASUREMENTS
Our sample includes 1077 patients: 283 in treatment group 1, 492 in treatment group 2,
and 302 in the control group. Figure 2.2 graphs the age distribution and the baseline
blood pressure distribution for all participants. The overall study population is hypertensive
patients with an average age of 66 and average base systolic blood pressure of 144.6 mmHg.
2.4.1 Measurements
We use systolic blood pressure to measure the severity of hypertension. Although there is a
distinction between systolic hypertension and diastolic hypertension, multiple studies show
that systolic blood pressure identifies most of people needing treatment while there is a de-
clining relative importance of diastolic pressure with advancing age (Kannel et al., 1971).
In 2008, three hypertension experts proposed that the systolic reading to be the only blood
pressure measurement used in tracking and diagnosing hypertension in population over age
50 (Williams et al., 2008). Thus, in our study, we focus on systolic blood pressure only.
We obtained bimonthly blood pressure data from the national chronic condition manage-
ment registry database and calculated the average blood pressure in 2012 and 2013 for each
individual in our sample.
Since intervention 2 started in the middle of 2013, the effect of this intervention on 2013
income is limited. Thus, we do not distinguish treatment group 1 from treatment group 2,
and refer to these two groups as the “treatment group.”
The average change in blood pressure for the control group and the treatment group,
along with 95% confidence intervals, are displayed in Figure 2.3. Subjects in the control
group experienced almost no change in blood pressure, while subjects in the treatment group
experienced an average blood pressure decrease of 6.19 mmHg. One common concern in the
medical literature of hypertension measurement is that the office readings of blood pressure
might be inaccurate, resulting in “white coat hypertension” or “masked hypertension”. More
specifically, white coat hypertension refers to scenarios where blood pressure is consistently
elevated for office readings but not for out-of-office readings; masked hypertension refers
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to blood pressure being consistently elevated for out-of-office readings but not for office
readings. This inaccuracy is usually caused by the pressure of being in a hospital and being
treated by an unknown health care professional. In our sample, patients’ blood pressure was
measured repeatedly (16 times) by the same doctors, who lived in the same neighborhood,
and whom the patients were familiar with. Moreover, the patients in our study had been
diagnosed with hypertension at least six months earlier and had three or more measures of
blood pressure greater than 140/90 mmHg in the Chinese national official medical record
before our interventions began. Thus, white coat hypertension and masked hypertension
were unlikely to occur in our trial.
Individuals were asked about their annual income and the change in annual income from
last year in the endpoint survey, allowing us to construct income data for 2012 and 2013.
One caveat is that this income includes government subsidy and pension, in addition to pure
labor income. We also cannot entirely rule out remittances from their adult children who
may have migrated to the city to seek jobs. To address this concern, we use the changes
in the log of annual income as our outcome variable, and examine how the changes in
health affect the percentage change in labor income. With respect to annual government
subsidies and pensions, these were the same for all of the towns and did not change during
our study period (Chongqing Civil Affairs Bureau, 2008). Thus the changes in the reported
income should only be the result of changes in labor income and possibly remittances. We
will further show that our results are not driven by remittance or government subsidies
employing placebo tests illustrated in Section 2.5.2. The distribution of changes in income
for the overall population is graphed in Figure 2.4. From 2012 to 2013, individuals’ average
income increased by 2.73%, with around 40% of people reporting no change and about 10%
experiencing more than a 10% increase or decrease.
As illustrated in Section 2.2.3, most rural residents in Qianjiang have labor income, but
the rest are supported by their family or the government. In order to estimate the effect on
those with labor income, we focus on individuals still in the labor force. We do not have any
direct indicators for their labor market status, so we use two indicators as proxies derived
from two survey questions. One question asks “Are you engaged in farming?” If the answer
is “Yes,” then the individual is labeled as “Farming” and considered to be inside the labor
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force. Another question asks “Is your physical ability severely impacted by diseases?” If the
answer is “No,” then the individual is labeled as “Not Disabled” and listed as inside the labor
force. The corresponding complementary sets are labeled as “Not Farming” and “Disabled.”
These two groups are largely overlapping, but there are still some discrepancies. For example,
those who are not engaged in farming can still be responsible for selling products on the local
market, while some do not do farm work even though their physical ability allows them to.
Thus we report results using both indicators. There are 735 individuals (68%) who are not
disabled and 566 individuals (53%) who are engaged in farming. Of individuals who are
engaged in farming, 93% are not disabled, and of those not disabled, 72% are engaged in
farming. These two groups will be the focus of our study in Section 2.5.
Figure 2.5 shows the comparison of income changes for individuals inside the labor force
between the treatment group and the control group. Individuals’ income in the control group
increased by around 2%, while the income in the treatment group increased by about 4%.
2.4.2 Covariates
Covariates include basic individual characteristics, health related characteristics, and town
level characteristics. Basic individual characteristics include age, gender, family structure
(living alone, with spouse, with children only, with spouse and children, or with others),
number of family members in the household, and education level (no education, elementary
and middle school, high school and above). Health related characteristics are salt control, fat
control, anti-hypertension drug usage, inpatient records, and personal medical expenditure.
Town characteristics are the number of residents in the town and the distance from the town
to county seat, taken from Table 2.1.
We show in Table 2.2 the comparative statistics of the baseline measurements. Most
of the individual characteristics are statistically similar, but there are some that differ.
Individuals in the treatment group have a higher baseline blood pressure and a lower baseline
income than the control group. The kernel distributions of the baseline income comparing
the control group and the treatment group are shown in Figure 2.6, suggesting that the
income in both groups follows a regular log-normal distribution. To address the differences
14
at the baseline, we include all the baseline values in the empirical analysis and utilize a
propensity score matching (PS weighting) method.
2.5 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
2.5.1 Instrumental Variable Approach
The most direct approach to estimate the effect of health on income is to run a regression of
percentage change in income, ∆LogInc, on the changes in blood pressure, ∆BP , controlling
for individual characteristics at the baseline:
∆LogInci = α1 + α2∆BPi + α3Covi + α4logInc12i + α5BP12i + i (2.1)
where Cov is a vector of the covariates introduced in the last section, logIn12 is the baseline
log of income in 2012, and BP12 is the baseline blood pressure in 2012. ∆LogInc =
(logInc13− logInc12)× 100, representing the percentage change in annual income.
However, using OLS regression can be problematic since health is endogenous. Thus, we
used an instrumental variable strategy, of which the first stage takes the following form:
∆BPi = β1 + β2IVi + β3Xi + υi (2.2)
where X is a vector of variables including Cov, logInc12, and BP12. The instrumental
variable IV is a binary indicator, with 1 indicating that the individuals are in the treatment
group. There are 6 towns and 55 villages in our sample. Even though theoretically standard
errors should be clustered at the town level, the number of clusters are too small (Donald and
Lang, 2007). We tested the size of the standard errors using different techniques: clustered at
the town level, clustered at the village level, bootstrapped, and the regular robust standard
error. (See Appendix A for details.) The magnitude of the standard errors does not change
much, so we choose the technique that gives us the most conservative option–clustering at
the village level. If the relevance restriction and exclusion restriction are both satisfied, the
instrumental variable strategy can correct the reverse causality and omitted variable biases.
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Thus, we can estimate the marginal causal effects of lowering blood pressure on income
consistently.
For easier interpretation, we standardized the blood pressure measure. After the stan-
dardization, change in blood pressure, ∆bp, had a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1:
∆bp = ∆BP−mean(∆BP )
sd(∆BP )
.
Table 2.3 presents the first stage results with F-statistics for individuals inside the labor
force under different specifications. The results show that the interventions significantly
decreased blood pressure by 0.341-0.479 standard deviation for those not disabled and 0.302-
0.378 standard deviation for those engaged in farming. All of the F-statistics were big enough
that we reject the null hypothesis that IV is a weak instrument for hypertension level.
The exclusion restriction hinges on the assumption that the instrument is uncorrelated
with the unobservable (cov(IV, υ) = 0) and only affects patients’ income through their
health. Since the two interventions were randomly assigned, the instrumental variables were
uncorrelated with unobservables like patients’ working hours and work strenuousness. Since
the interventions were imposed directly on health care providers rather than on patients,
the effect on patients’ income could only have come from changes in their health. Thus,
the exclusion restriction is satisfied. We will address more concerns regarding the exclusion
restriction and identification in Section 2.5.2.
We also used two different instruments, one indicating treated by intervention 1 and the
other indicating treated by intervention 2. Since intervention 2 started in the middle of 2013,
the effect of this intervention on 2013 income is limited. Thus we consider this approach as
supplementary evidence and show the results in Appendix B. The results are qualitatively
the same as our main specification using only one instrument.
2.5.2 Addressing Concerns of Identification
2.5.2.1 Differences in Income At the baseline, individuals in the treatment group have
higher annual income than those in the control group. To address the unbalanced baseline
income, we utilized a propensity score method with an inverse probability of treatment
weighting to balance the characteristics of individuals in each group (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
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1983; Hirano and Imbens, 2001). When calculating the propensity scores, we accounted for
the individual-level characteristics mentioned in Section 2.4.2, together with baseline income
and blood pressure, using a logistic regression to estimate the probability of being in the
treatment group. We then assigned a weight to each observation that is the inverse of the
estimated propensity score of the individual’s assignment to its group. Weightings were
calculated separately for each sub-population: individuals engaged in farming, individuals
not engaged in farming, not disabled individuals, and disabled individuals. After weighting,
all characteristics were balanced (Table 2.4). We report estimation results with and without
propensity score weighting in Section 2.6.
If “regression to the mean” is a concern, i.e. those with higher baseline income might
have a slower growth in the future, our estimation can be considered as a lower bound since
treated subjects are the ones with higher income.
2.5.2.2 Instrument Validation Since randomization occurred at the town level, there
are concerns that the income differences were driven by changes in non-labor income at group
level, such as remittances or government subsidies, or some unobservable characteristics
related to town-level crop output.
In order to rule out the possibility that the effect came from the changes in non-labor in-
come, we conducted falsification tests using individuals outside the labor force—“Not Farm-
ing” and “Disabled”—as placebos. If the results were driven by income from remittances
or government subsidies, we would observe similar effect among individuals both inside and
outside the labor force; if not, the effect would only show up for individuals in the labor
force.
Figure 2.7 reports the mean changes in blood pressure with 95% confidence interval
for treated individuals inside and outside the labor force respectively. Blood pressure was
lowered by a similar amount, regardless of their labor force status. This suggests that if their
income changes are different, it is not due to the different drops in blood pressure level.
As for the unobservable characteristics related to crop output at town level, since our
outcome variable is the changes in income, the identification is valid as long as there are
no changes in elements that affected crop harvest differently for different towns. All six
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participating towns are close to each other, so there are limited differences in temperature,
rainfall, sun exposure and other climate characteristics. Since all six towns are in the same
county, there was no difference in technology adoption and profitability of different crops as
well.
To further alleviate any concerns in this matter, we include town characteristics such as
population and distance to county seat in the covariates to control for any differences among
towns.
2.5.2.3 Health Measurement Another concern is that the results might not come
directly from hypertension, but from some mental effect or other health improvement induced
by the interventions. For example, getting more attention from the doctors might increase
the happiness and productivity of the patients. We used RAND’s Medical Outcome Study
Short-Form 36-Item Health Survey (SF36) as a comprehensive subjective health measure to
rule out these possibilities.4
The SF36 score relies upon patient self-reporting on 36 questions and it is widely used
by heathcare organizations for routine monitoring and assessment of care outcomes in adult
patients. For easier interpretation, we scale all the scores to be between 0 and 100. The
larger the number, the healthier the individual feels. We used the total summary score (SF36
score), and the results were qualitatively the same when using more detailed indicators.
The SF36 score for each individual was obtained from the two surveys. The mean values
of changes in SF36 score for individuals engaged in farming and not disabled individuals are
displayed in Figure 2.8 with their 95% confidence intervals. Subjects in the control group
show almost no change in SF36 score, while on average there is a 0.23 standard deviation
increase for the treatment group.
We used two strategies to verify that the improvement in income was caused by decreases
in blood pressure, instead of changes to other health characteristics. First, we include ∆SF—
the change in SF36 score between 2012 and 2013—in the covariates and re-run the model
illustrated by equations (2.1) and (2.2). If the improvement in income is indeed due to
hypertension control, including ∆SF would render no difference to our main results. Second,
4For more details, see RAND website on SF36 Survey.
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we use another instrumental variable model as below which instruments the changes in the
SF36 score, ∆SF , instead of the changes in blood pressure, ∆BP :
∆sfi = η1 + η2IVi + η3Covi + η4logInc12i + η5SF12i + i (2.3)
∆LogInci = µ1 + µ2∆sfi + µ3Covi + µ4logInc12i + µ5SF12i + υi (2.4)
where ∆sf is the standardized changes in SF36 score: ∆sf = ∆SF−mean(∆SF )
sd(∆SF )
2.5.2.4 Selection Since the interventions are directly imposed on the delivery system
and health care providers and not patients themselves, there is a potential patient selection
problem. However, even though residents in these six towns have the freedom to choose
their providers, they almost always go to the clinics or infirmary in their own towns because
of convenience. We checked the inpatient records between 2008 and 2014, finding that only
0.8% (44 out of 5,116 cases) of town level hospital stays involved patients attending hospitals
located in a different town. Thus the hospital selection problem and unintended treatment
are trivial.
2.5.3 Income Improvement Channels
To further verify the second stage of the instrumental variable approach, we clarify the
channels through which hypertension affects income. Since we only examine income changes
over a short period of time (two years), farmers cannot improve their earnings by switching
to crops that are more profitable. Thus there are only two ways for the farmers to actively
increase their income: improve labor productivity or elongate working hours. Better health
can potentially lead to both.
We used several indexes to measure the influence of physical well-being on different
aspects of work. We have an overall index that is derived from the question “Did your
physical pain negatively affect your work or housework in the past month?” It takes on
values between 1 and 5, with 1 corresponding to a big impact and 5 no impact. We created
three other binary indexes, one for labor time and two for labor productivity. Time index
is derived from the question “Did you decrease labor hours due to health reasons in the
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past month?” Productivity index 1 is derived from the question “Did you feel that you can
only complete part of the daily task you planned due to health reasons in the past month?”
Productivity index 2 is derived from the question “Did you feel it is more difficult to work
due to health reasons in the past month?” We then calculated the changes in these indexes
before and after the interventions and used them as the outcome variables. Changes in the
overall index ranged between -4 and 4, with a larger number indicating less of a negative
impact on work due to physical pain. Changes in the time index and productivity index 1
and 2 all took the value of -1, 0, and 1. 1 indicates improved labor productivity or longer
labor time compared to the previous year; -1 indicates reduced productivity or decreased
time; 0 indicates no changes.
We ran the following regressions to examine whether productivity and time were affected
by blood pressure level:
∆Indexi = λ1 + λ2∆bpi + λ3Covi + λ4Index12i + ςi (2.5)
where ∆Index is the changes between baseline and the endpoint survey in one of the four
indexes, Index12 is the baseline index level, and Cov is the vector of covariates introduced in
Section ??. If λ4 is negative, it suggests that lower blood pressure is accompanied by smaller
impact from physical pain, higher productivity, or longer working time. We conducted this
analysis respectively for individuals engaged in farming, individuals who were not disabled,
and the overall population.
2.6 RESULTS AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
2.6.1 Instrumental Variable Results
Table 2.5 reports the effect of changes in health on percentage changes in income for those
who are not disabled. We explored different specifications and showed results both with or
without PS weighting. Column (1) in the table presents estimations from an OLS regression
and columns (2)-(5) the results from instrumental variable approaches. In the OLS regres-
sion, changes in systolic blood pressure level show a very small correlation with income: a one
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standard deviation decrease in blood pressure is related to about 1% increase in income, the
equivalent of 68 RMB. After instrumenting blood pressure level, the magnitude of the effects
greatly increases. For not disabled individuals, a one standard deviation decrease in blood
pressure now increases income by 5.21%-5.51% without propensity score weighting (upper
panel column (2)-column (5)). After balancing the baseline characteristics with propensity
score weighting, the magnitude of the coefficients slightly decreases but is still very sizable:
a one standard deviation decrease in blood pressure increases income by 4.20%-5.06%(lower
panel column (2)-column (5)). This effect is robust under different specifications, indicating
that town level differences at the baseline are not driving the results. The increase in the
magnitude of the coefficient is most likely due to the omitted variable in the OLS regression,
such as work strenuousness that increases income and deteriorates health at the same time.
Table 2.6 shows similar patterns for those who are engaged in farming. Simple correlation
between health changes and percentage changes in income is small (1%) but the causal
effect is large: a one standard deviation decrease in blood pressure increases income by
9.26%-10.29% without propensity score weighting and 7.17%-8.91% with propensity score
weighting. Comparing Table 2.6 with Table 2.5, the effect is much larger for those engaged
in farming than those who are not disabled. Since physical ability is most important for
those engaged in farming, it is not surprising that an improvement in health benefits them
the most.
The instrumental variable results reported here were calculated using a Two-Stage-Least-
Square (2SLS) estimator. We also used a Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML)
estimator instead of the 2SLS estimator, following Imbens (2014), and the results are virtu-
ally the same.
2.6.2 Placebo Test Results
To verify our identification strategy, we conduct placebo tests using individuals outside the
labor force and report. Results are reported in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8. For those whose
physical abilities are severely impacted by disease (Table 2.7) or individuals not engaged in
farming (Table 2.8), the coefficient estimations are all positive and insignificant, suggesting
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that their income stayed unchanged even though their blood pressure level dropped at a
rate similar to those inside the labor force. Thus, hypertension control only improves la-
bor income, relieving our concern that government subsidies and remittances might have
confounded the results.
2.6.3 Subjective Measure SF36 as a Supplement
To rule out the possibility that the changes in income are driven by other changes brought by
the interventions, instead of hypertension, we use the SF36 score as a self-assessed measure
for overall health. We first include it in the covariates and report the results in Table 2.9.
Including the SF36 score renders almost no change to our main results in Table 2.5 and Table
2.6. With PS weighting, a one standard deviation decrease in blood pressure at least increases
income for not disabled individuals by 4.286% (upper panel column (4)) and individuals
engaged in farming by 7.042% (lower panel column (4)), which is very similar to the 4.201%
and 7.172% without the inclusion of changes in the SF36 score. The coefficients for the
changes in SF36 score are insignificant, suggesting that all of the effects are represented by
blood pressure level.
We further instrument the changes in SF36 score directly using the same instrumental
variable, IVi, which indicates subjects being treated by the interventions. Results are re-
ported in Table 2.10, none of which are significant, suggesting that the SF36 score has no
impact on changes in income. This finding supports Wu (2003)’s claim that subjective health
measure can be confounded, since an individual may feel better physically and mentally when
the household is financially better off.
2.6.4 Income Improvement Channels
At last, we verified the second stage of the instrumental variable regressions by examining
whether health affects income through labor productivity or time. Results are reported
in Table 2.11. Overall, with the decrease in blood pressure level, individuals in our study
reported less negative impact on their work due to physical pain. When we examine the
effect on labor productivity indexes and time index, we find that a lower blood pressure
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is significantly related with an increased labor productivity, but the relationship between
health and labor time is not significant. These links are robust among individuals who are
engaged in farming, individuals who are not disabled, and the overall population. Consistent
with Tables 2.5 and 2.6, those engaged in farming are the most affected since physical ability
is most important for them. This suggests that improving hypertension mainly improve
earnings through increased labor productivity instead of elongated working hours.
2.6.5 Cost-Benefit Analysis
We conducted a cost-benefit analysis to assess whether these health interventions can result
in welfare gains. In particular, we calculated and compared the cost of conducting the trial
with the income improvement induced by the interventions.
There are four costs related to the interventions: labor costs, operational expenditures,
the financial bonus, and gifts provided to survey participants. First, labor costs for extra
work from health care providers in the study is an estimated 644.36 extra hours per month
for all of the participating towns. The health care providers were not actually paid for these
extra hours in the trial, so they have no financial incentive to exaggerate a reported number.
We assigned a 21 RMB hourly wage rate in this exercise to calculate the corresponding labor
cost.5 The total cost associated with extra labor hours is thus 162,378 RMB a year (644.36×
21×12 RMB). Second, the main operational expenditures were around 19,004 RMB per year.
This includes costs related to staff training and group learning; printing documents for health
education, health records and information transfer; and accommodation and transportation
for group meetings and on-site visits. Third, the total bonus paid to the providers in Group
2 was 140,000 RMB. Even though intervention 2 started in June 2013 hence its effect on
income in 2013 should be limited, we still included this cost in order to be conservative for
the welfare gain estimation. Fourth, in order to increase the response rate of the in-house
survey, we asked the village clinicians who know patients well to accompany the interviewers
5We use the average annual salary in Chongqing in 2012 as the standard to calculate the hourly wage, and
assume that people work 52 weeks a year, 5 days a week and 8 hours a day. The result is 21.82 RMB/hour.
Since rural area usually has a lower hourly wage than the equivalent number calculated from annual salary,
this gives us an upper bound for the actual hourly wage. Also note that the minimum hourly wage in
Qianjiang in 2012 is 10.5 RMB/hour (Chongqing Human Resource Bureau, 2012), so our number is twice
the value.
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to patient homes, and we provided some gifts such as toothpaste and soap. The value of the
gifts was about 16,000 RMB. In sum, the total cost of these two interventions was 337,383
RMB per year.
When calculating the gain from the interventions, we pick the most conservative results
so that our estimations are the lower-bound. Table 2.5 suggests that for not disabled indi-
viduals, one standard deviation decrease in blood pressure (9.50 mmHg) at least increases
income by 4.20%, an equivalent of 287.94 RMB. Table 2.6 suggests that for those engaged in
farming, one standard deviation decrease in blood pressure (9.54 mmHg) at least increases
income by 7.17%, an equivalent of 490.42 RMB. On average, the blood pressure for indi-
viduals in the treatment group was lowered by 6.58 mmHg for those not disabled and 6.44
mmHg for those engaged in farming. Thus the per capita annual increase in income in-
duced by blood pressure improvement is 199.44 RMB (287.94× 6.58
9.50
) for those not disabled
or 331.06 RMB (490.42× 6.44
9.54
) for those engaged in farming. There were 4,193 hypertensive
patients treated in our trial in the 4 towns. Assuming that the percentage of individuals
inside the labor force in the randomized samples are the representative of all the treated
4,193 hypertensive patients, then individuals who are not disabled and individuals engaged
in farming consist of 68% and 53% of the treated patients, respectively. The improved in-
come is then estimated to be 579,698 RMB (199.44× 4193× 68%) for those not disabled, or
729,511 RMB (331.06 × 4193 × 53%) for those engaged in farming. The most conservative
estimation of benefit from improved income is almost twice the size of the cost. If we take
into consideration the benefit from improved physical well-being, the welfare gains could be
even more substantial.
In summary, the health interventions that we conducted to lower blood pressure resulted
in sizable welfare gain, even in the short run. In the long term, we expect this gain to be
larger.
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2.7 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we examined the effect of hypertension control on income in rural China by
taking advantage of a dataset collected from a randomized controlled trial designed to im-
prove hypertension management. Our study participants are mainly self-employed farmers,
whose physical conditions affect their labor income substantially, which allows us to observe
the impact of decreasing blood pressure in the short run.
We found that a one standard deviation decrease in systolic blood pressure can signif-
icantly increase annual income by 7.17% for individuals engaged in farming and 4.20% for
individuals who are not disabled. We examined the channels through which health can affect
income and found that the increase in income came from an improvement in labor produc-
tivity rather than an elongation of working hours. Cost-benefit analysis shows that the gain
from improved income is much larger than the cost of the interventions, suggesting that our
interventions to improve hypertension resulted in substantial welfare gains.
There have been rising interests in the literature on the relationship between labor market
outcomes and chronic diseases, such as diabetes and depression. In general, there is a lack
of research on labor market impact of all prevalent chronic diseases in low or middle income
countries. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the link between hypertension
and income. With respect to type 2 diabetes, a literature review shows that studies on high-
income countries generally find a considerable negative impact of diabetes on employment
choices and income, but the economic burden associated with diabetes in developing countries
is less clear (Seuring et al., 2015). In the only paper that focuses on China in this area, Liu
and Zhu (2014) find that diabetes leads to an average 16.3% decrease in income after people
are diagnosed. Depression is another chronic disease that has gained much attention in the
economics literature. Kessler et al. (1999) suggest that treating workers’ depression can help
employers to save money on disability. Both Chatterji et al. (2011) and Peng et al. (2015) find
that depression is associated with reductions in labor force participation and employment,
but has no effect on hourly wage, most likely due to the prevalence of employment contracts
(Chatterji et al., 2011; Peng et al., 2015).
Our results are encouraging and they fill the gaps in the literature on the labor market
25
effects of chronic diseases in the developing countries, but it is not without limitations. One
major concern is that the randomization was at the town level, so the results might not
have been caused by lowered blood pressure but some other characteristics that varied at
the town level. We alleviate this concern by noting the similarities among the six towns in
agriculture technology, crop composition, and climate, and conducting placebo tests using
individuals outside the labor force. Another limitation is that the findings might not be
able to be extrapolated to a richer, younger, or more urban population. Our interventions
were conducted in a rural county in China, where labor costs were low and hypertension
management was poor. The study subjects are hypertensive farmers with an average age of
65 years old, with very different income structures compared to the urban residents. The
hypertension management is more advanced in urban areas, which renders lower marginal
return, while the expense of conducting similar interventions can be larger in urban areas,
resulting in higher marginal cost.
However, our results can be applied to similar rural populations in other developing
countries in South Asia, Africa, and South America, especially for countries where the burden
of chronic conditions, including hypertension and other cardiovascular diseases, is rapidly
increasing. China, the most populous country in the world and a country facing the problem
of an aging population, contains 18% of the world’s population. As of 2014, there are 618.7
million rural residents and 137.6 million people above 65 years old. Thus, even without
extrapolating, our paper helps inform a policy discussion that is deeply important to a large
segment of the world’s population.
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Figure 2.1: Location of Chongqing City and Qianjiang County
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Figure 2.2: Sample Characteristics: Senior Hypertensive Patients
Note: Our study population is hypertensive patients with an average age of 66 and average base systolic
blood pressure of 144.6 mmHg.
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Figure 2.3: Changes in Blood Pressure with 95% CI
Note: Subjects in the treatment group are those exposed to intervention 1 or intervention 2.
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Figure 2.4: Distribution in the Percentage Change in Income
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Figure 2.5: Percentage Change in Income with 95% CI
Note: Subjects in the treatment group are those exposed to intervention 1 or intervention 2. The left plot
shows the percentage change in income for individulas engaged in farming and the right plot shows the
number for those who are not disabled. In both cases, individuals in the treatment group have a larger
growth in income.
31
Figure 2.6: Kernel Distribution for Income in the Treatment and Control Group
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Figure 2.7: Changes in Blood Pressure in the Treatment Group with 95% CI
Note: This figure shows the changes in blood pressure level in the treatment group for those inside and
outside the labor force, respectively. The left plot distinguishs individuals’ labor market status by asking
whether they are engaged in farming or not, and the right plot by whether they are disabled or not.
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Figure 2.8: Changes in SF36 Scores with 95% CI
Note: Subjects in the treatment group are those exposed to intervention 1 or intervention 2. The left plot
shows the change in SF36 score for individulas engaged in farming and the right plot shows the number for
those who are not disabled.
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Table 2.1: Characteristics Used to Randomly Assign Six Towns to Three Groups
Group 1 Group 2 Control
Apengjiang Jinxi Zhoushui Shihui Fengjia Shijia
Number of residents 28,000 15,600 27,055 22,448 27,464 14,126
Annual income per capita (RMB) 6452 5417 6487 5452 6900 5031
Distance to county seat (minutes) 50 90 30 60 25 100
Medical revenue (10,000 RMB) 265 169 279 198 311 159
Notes: These basic characteristics were surveyed in July 2012 and used to randomly assign towns to
the three groups. We first divided the six towns equally into two clusters: one cluster of three towns
with a smaller population, lower socioeconomic development levels, poorer hospital quality, and further
distance away from the county seat (Jinxi, Shihui, and Shijia); and the other cluster with contrasting
characteristics. In each cluster, we randomly assigned three towns to Groups 1, 2 and the control group,
respectively. This table is the same as Table 1 in Zhang et al. (2017).
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: Comparison of Characteristics at the Baseline
mean(Control) mean(Treat) Difference s.e.
Age 66.28 67.27 -0.99 0.67
Female ratio (%) 55.31 53.43 1.88 3.27
Living alone (%) 14.57 15.87 -1.30 2.46
Living with spouse (%) 36.09 32.90 3.19 3.21
Living with kids (%) 17.22 15.87 1.35 2.50
Living with spouse and kids (%) 30.13 33.81 -3.67 3.19
Attended elementary school (%) 46.95 52.36 -5.41 3.27
Attended high school or above (%) 17.04 17.34 -0.30 2.48
Family size 3.53 3.73 -0.20 0.16
Personal medical expenditure (RMB) 2566 2271 295 439
Salt control 3.22 3.42 -0.21* 0.10
Fat control 3.47 3.59 -0.11 0.10
Medicine usage (%) 35.10 36.16 -1.07 3.26
Inpatient rate (%) 18.01 18.84 -0.84 2.55
Average income in 2012 (RMB) 5482 6786 -1303*** 371
Baseline Blood Pressure(mmHg) 140.87 145.79 -4.92*** 0.63
Notes: Salt control and fat control: 1=never 2=occasional 3=sometimes 4=often 5=always.
Significance level in t-test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.3: First Stage Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample: Not Disabled
IV -0.341*** -0.429*** -0.443*** -0.387*** -0.465*** -0.479***
(0.128) (0.129) (0.127) (0.120) (0.119) (0.115)
Age -0.00117 -0.00233 -0.000613 -0.00302 -0.00408 -0.00274
(0.00419) (0.00402) (0.00402) (0.00460) (0.00450) (0.00450)
Female ratio -0.000673 -0.000871 -0.000950 -0.000575 -0.000717 -0.000764
(0.000797) (0.000744) (0.000775) (0.000903) (0.000858) (0.000877)
Log(income-12) -0.0311 -0.0195 -0.0320 -0.0179 -0.00581 -0.0167
(0.0352) (0.0348) (0.0345) (0.0382) (0.0402) (0.0399)
Baseline BP -0.0573*** -0.0598*** -0.0596*** -0.0550*** -0.0576*** -0.0571***
(0.00378) (0.00341) (0.00337) (0.00310) (0.00267) (0.00276)
First stage F-stats 26.35 31.77 35.71 55.49 59.89 59.49
Observations 735 735 708 735 735 708
Include Health Variables No No Yes No No Yes
Include Town Variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
PS Weighting No No No Yes Yes Yes
Sample: Farming
IV -0.302* -0.354** -0.359** -0.324** -0.365** -0.378**
(0.155) (0.152) (0.150) (0.160) (0.148) (0.145)
Age 0.000137 -0.00208 -0.00172 0.000314 -0.00320 -0.00389
(0.00484) (0.00454) (0.00460) (0.00776) (0.00727) (0.00762)
Female ratio -0.000497 -0.000676 -0.000997 -6.53e-05 -6.41e-05 -0.000245
(0.000748) (0.000727) (0.000757) (0.00116) (0.00111) (0.00112)
Log(income-12) -0.00679 0.0159 0.00378 -0.00338 0.0140 0.00266
(0.0502) (0.0480) (0.0482) (0.0556) (0.0554) (0.0493)
Baseline BP -0.0598*** -0.0619*** -0.0624*** -0.0620*** -0.0653*** -0.0658***
(0.00453) (0.00428) (0.00447) (0.00484) (0.00452) (0.00469)
First stage F-stats 22.08 22.81 25.11 21.01 21.86 23.22
Observations 566 566 541 566 566 541
Include Health Variables No No Yes No No Yes
Include Town Variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
PS Weighting No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the first stage results for the IV regressions. All regressions include basic
individual characteristics. “Health variables” include salt control, fat control, anti-hypertension
drug usage, and inpatient records. “Town variables” include the number of residents in the town
and the distance from the town to county seat. Robust standard errors are clustered at village
level. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
37
Table 2.4: Comparative Statistics after Propensity Score Weighting
Farming Not Disabled Not Farming Disabled
Control Treat p-value Control Treat p-value Control Treat p-value Control Treat p-value
Age 63.80 63.57 0.84 63.40 64.70 0.43 66.65 69.51 0.22 70.19 70.06 0.92
Female ratio 48.87 53.17 0.44 55.04 53.40 0.77 62.26 55.38 0.29 59.67 55.16 0.54
Live alone 12.24 11.90 0.92 12.89 13.82 0.76 20.20 20.01 0.97 29.44 20.02 0.28
Live with spouse 35.56 35.64 0.99 33.39 35.85 0.61 29.66 33.24 0.52 31.73 32.27 0.94
Live with kids 12.19 12.40 0.95 19.25 13.24 0.39 23.82 19.47 0.61 16.26 21.05 0.31
Live with spouse & kids 38.64 38.58 0.99 33.20 35.64 0.63 25.09 25.56 0.93 21.35 24.67 0.56
Attended grade school 60.24 58.19 0.69 59.03 56.22 0.60 46.67 44.60 0.79 36.73 41.71 0.48
Attended high school 20.23 20.85 0.88 17.64 19.61 0.57 10.61 13.12 0.48 9.57 12.47 0.53
Family size 3.62 3.72 0.67 3.89 3.75 0.64 3.64 3.49 0.70 3.25 3.40 0.65
Medical expenditure 1689 2082 0.37 2777 2415 0.65 3342 2741 0.43 3210 3015 0.87
Medicine usage 42.09 38.23 0.49 36.33 37.15 0.88 34.06 34.71 0.92 41.00 33.05 0.33
Salt control 3.22 3.26 0.81 3.30 3.34 0.76 3.51 3.52 0.94 3.53 3.47 0.72
Fat control 3.46 3.49 0.88 3.64 3.56 0.66 3.79 3.64 0.43 3.53 3.51 0.95
Inpatient rate 17.58 18.37 0.83 17.02 19.14 0.55 17.83 20.41 0.58 18.62 19.13 0.93
Average income in 2012 6943 6465 0.68 6834 6602 0.82 7124 6954 0.92 5240 6852 0.01
Baseline Blood Pressure 144.60 144.84 0.83 148.59 145.21 0.38 149.57 144.83 0.33 145.52 143.97 0.63
Notes: This table show the comparative statistics after propensity score weighting. Weightings are calculated separately for each
group: individuals engaged in farming, individuals not engaged in farming, not disabled individuals, and disabled individuals.
Individuals in the treatment groups are those exposed to the interventions. Significance level in t-test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table 2.5: Effect of Health on Percentage Change in Income: Not Disabled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV IV IV IV
Without PS Weighting
Change in blood pressure -1.011** -5.344* -5.513** -5.209* -5.424**
(0.394) (2.931) (2.781) (2.700) (2.628)
Age 0.0288 0.00754 0.00408 0.0292 0.0264
(0.0499) (0.0485) (0.0488) (0.0498) (0.0501)
Female ratio 0.00468 0.00192 0.00132 0.00168 0.000940
(0.00540) (0.00608) (0.00632) (0.00641) (0.00669)
Log(income-12) -0.508 -0.617 -0.527 -0.801 -0.726
(0.689) (0.729) (0.675) (0.776) (0.729)
Baseline Blood Pressure -0.117** -0.392** -0.402** -0.378** -0.391**
(0.0543) (0.196) (0.186) (0.181) (0.175)
With PS Weighting
Change in blood pressure -1.096*** -4.479** -5.064** -4.201** -4.812**
(0.345) (1.996) (2.294) (1.906) (2.208)
Age 0.0291 -0.00133 -0.00475 0.0190 0.0170
(0.0488) (0.0474) (0.0481) (0.0481) (0.0489)
Female ratio 0.00358 0.00120 0.000704 0.00145 0.000752
(0.00551) (0.00622) (0.00654) (0.00635) (0.00675)
Log(income-12) -0.475 -0.480 -0.384 -0.602 -0.526
(0.724) (0.705) (0.662) (0.759) (0.723)
Baseline Blood Pressure -0.159*** -0.344*** -0.380*** -0.327*** -0.362***
(0.0441) (0.123) (0.141) (0.115) (0.133)
Observations 708 735 735 708 708
Include Health Variables Yes No No Yes Yes
Include Town Variables Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: This table reports the effect of lowering blood pressure on percentage
change in annual income (%) for individuals who are not disabled. All regressions
include basic individual characteristics. “Health variables” include salt control,
fat control, anti-hypertension drug usage, and inpatient records. “Town variables”
include the number of residents in the town and the distance from the town to
county seat. Robust standard errors are clustered at village level. Significance
level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
39
Table 2.6: Effect of Health on Percentage Change in Income: Farming
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV IV IV IV
Without PS Weighting
Change in blood pressure -1.093** -9.592* -10.12** -9.264* -10.29**
(0.422) (5.151) (4.963) (4.889) (4.904)
Age 0.0170 0.0139 -0.00395 0.0202 0.00396
(0.0594) (0.0627) (0.0639) (0.0650) (0.0686)
Female ratio 0.00573 0.00342 0.00202 -0.000420 -0.00280
(0.00868) (0.0116) (0.0122) (0.0124) (0.0137)
Log(income-12) -0.689 -0.716 -0.380 -1.108 -0.771
(0.774) (0.892) (0.834) (0.945) (0.912)
Baseline Blood Pressure -0.113* -0.666* -0.704** -0.641* -0.707**
(0.0660) (0.342) (0.331) (0.330) (0.330)
With PS Weighting
Change in blood pressure -1.312*** -7.485* -8.873** -7.172** -8.915**
(0.394) (3.823) (4.286) (3.642) (4.023)
Age 0.0146 0.0126 -0.0154 0.0101 -0.0167
(0.0537) (0.0665) (0.0715) (0.0656) (0.0764)
Female ratio 0.00359 0.00417 0.00455 0.00190 0.00124
(0.00887) (0.0127) (0.0134) (0.0128) (0.0140)
Log(income-12) -0.388 -0.319 -0.0879 -0.546 -0.315
(0.753) (0.710) (0.705) (0.772) (0.782)
Baseline Blood Pressure -0.125* -0.520** -0.624** -0.498* -0.620**
(0.0670) (0.264) (0.294) (0.262) (0.279)
Observations 541 566 566 541 541
Include Health Variables Yes No No Yes Yes
Include Town Variables Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: This table reports the effect of lowering blood pressure on percentage
change in annual income (%) for individuals engaged in farming. All regressions
include basic individual characteristics. “Health variables” include salt control,
fat control, anti-hypertension drug usage, and inpatient records. “Town vari-
ables” include the number of residents in the town and the distance from the
town to county seat. Robust standard errors are clustered at village level.
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7: Placebo Tests: Disabled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV IV IV IV
Without PS Weighting
Change in blood pressure -0.562 1.641 2.683 2.113 2.564
(0.458) (3.249) (3.585) (3.355) (3.444)
Age 0.0527 0.0511 0.0546 0.0384 0.0431
(0.0386) (0.0433) (0.0430) (0.0404) (0.0386)
Female ratio 0.0126 0.0147* 0.0153* 0.0129 0.0141
(0.00962) (0.00820) (0.00863) (0.00879) (0.00929)
Log(income-12) -0.541 -0.0402 -0.495 -0.0554 -0.440
(0.529) (0.555) (0.517) (0.577) (0.516)
Baseline Blood Pressure -0.158*** -0.0201 0.0348 -0.00109 0.0247
(0.0449) (0.196) (0.214) (0.199) (0.205)
With PS Weighting
Change in blood pressure -0.534 1.276 2.799 1.310 2.351
(0.548) (2.925) (3.480) (2.797) (3.333)
Age 0.0778 0.0834* 0.0770* 0.0633 0.0597
(0.0475) (0.0450) (0.0443) (0.0437) (0.0445)
Female ratio 0.0126 0.0146 0.0147 0.0120 0.0129
(0.0115) (0.0107) (0.0112) (0.0105) (0.0110)
Log(income-12) -0.424 0.0864 -0.507 0.0716 -0.447
(0.731) (0.795) (0.749) (0.754) (0.704)
Baseline Blood Pressure -0.157*** -0.0700 0.0373 -0.0727 0.00426
(0.0417) (0.178) (0.213) (0.168) (0.200)
Observations 331 342 342 331 331
Include Health Variables Yes No No Yes Yes
Include Town Variables Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: This table reports the placebo tests using individuals who are disabled. All
regressions include basic individual characteristics. “Health variables” include salt
control, fat control, anti-hypertension drug usage, and inpatient records. “Town
variables” include the number of residents in the town and the distance from
the town to county seat. Robust standard errors are clustered at village level.
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.8: Placebo Tests: Not Farming
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV IV IV IV
Without PS Weighting
Change in blood pressure -0.666 1.808 2.737 1.780 2.552
(0.407) (3.025) (3.530) (2.832) (3.287)
Age 0.0552 0.0517 0.0561 0.0481 0.0516
(0.0410) (0.0474) (0.0477) (0.0370) (0.0377)
Female ratio 0.00875 0.00892 0.0111 0.00764 0.0102
(0.0109) (0.00985) (0.0110) (0.0101) (0.0114)
Log(income-12) -0.359 0.0720 -0.206 0.105 -0.161
(0.520) (0.756) (0.597) (0.811) (0.646)
Baseline Blood Pressure -0.146*** 0.00988 0.0552 0.00267 0.0388
(0.0491) (0.181) (0.204) (0.163) (0.183)
With PS Weighting
Change in blood pressure -0.404 1.830 2.848 1.855 2.762
(0.428) (2.384) (3.330) (2.147) (3.040)
Age 0.0552 0.0498 0.0583 0.0509 0.0541
(0.0400) (0.0494) (0.0497) (0.0373) (0.0366)
Female ratio 0.0114 0.0123 0.0146 0.0118 0.0147
(0.0107) (0.0103) (0.0123) (0.0106) (0.0126)
Log(income-12) 0.109 0.366 0.0557 0.367 0.102
(0.502) (0.596) (0.459) (0.625) (0.496)
Baseline Blood Pressure -0.117*** -0.0150 0.0581 -0.0172 0.0489
(0.0404) (0.137) (0.193) (0.119) (0.172)
Observations 498 511 511 498 498
Include Health Variables Yes No No Yes Yes
Include Town Variables Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: This table reports the placebo tests using individuals not engaged
in farming. All regressions include basic individual characteristics. “Health
variables” include salt control, fat control, anti-hypertension drug usage, and
inpatient records. “Town variables” include the number of residents in the
town and the distance from the town to county seat. Robust standard errors
are clustered at village level. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table 2.9: Subjective Measure as Supplement: Including ∆SF36 as a Covariate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV IV IV IV
Sample: Not Disabled
Change in blood pressure -1.069*** -4.535** -5.068** -4.286** -4.824**
(0.349) (1.915) (2.283) (1.820) (2.188)
Change in SF36 score -0.326 -0.105 -0.0619 -0.146 -0.0934
(0.391) (0.394) (0.435) (0.397) (0.430)
Age 0.0243 -0.00266 -0.00552 0.0168 0.0155
(0.0484) (0.0469) (0.0475) (0.0472) (0.0479)
Female ratio 0.00328 0.00106 0.000628 0.00129 0.000654
(0.00555) (0.00630) (0.00657) (0.00644) (0.00677)
Log(income-12) -0.487 -0.485 -0.387 -0.608 -0.529
(0.728) (0.706) (0.665) (0.761) (0.725)
Baseline Blood Pressure -0.155*** -0.346*** -0.380*** -0.329*** -0.362***
(0.0450) (0.121) (0.142) (0.112) (0.133)
Observations 708 735 735 708 708
Include Health Variables Yes No No Yes Yes
Include Town Variables Yes No Yes No Yes
Sample: Farming
Change in blood pressure -1.304*** -7.384** -8.842** -7.042** -8.849**
(0.402) (3.683) (4.223) (3.480) (3.918)
Change in SF36 score -0.120 0.254 0.295 0.267 0.350
(0.542) (0.637) (0.742) (0.644) (0.757)
Age 0.0126 0.0153 -0.0117 0.0144 -0.0105
(0.0530) (0.0647) (0.0674) (0.0626) (0.0696)
Female ratio 0.00336 0.00471 0.00518 0.00243 0.00194
(0.00889) (0.0126) (0.0134) (0.0127) (0.0139)
Log(income-12) -0.395 -0.302 -0.0681 -0.530 -0.296
(0.757) (0.704) (0.713) (0.767) (0.791)
Baseline Blood Pressure -0.123* -0.516** -0.624** -0.492* -0.618**
(0.0671) (0.258) (0.293) (0.254) (0.274)
Observations 541 566 566 541 541
Include Health Variables Yes No No Yes Yes
Include Town Variables Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Outcome variable is the percentage change in annual income (%). All
regressions include basic individual characteristics and use PS weighting. “Health
variables” include salt control, fat control, anti-hypertension drug usage, and in-
patient records. “Town variables” include the number of residents in the town
and the distance from the town to county seat. “Farming” refers to individuals
who are engaged in agriculture work. “Not Disabled” refers to individuals whose
physical ability are not severely limited due to diseases. Robust standard errors
are clustered at village level. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.10: Subjective Measure as Supplement: Instrumenting ∆SF36
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV IV IV IV
Sample: Not Disabled
Change in SF36 score -0.392 8.312 76.33 7.269 39.41
(0.398) (7.193) (373.7) (5.913) (98.32)
Age 0.0268 0.104 0.953 0.126 0.624
(0.0491) (0.0961) (4.653) (0.0948) (1.517)
Female ratio 0.00403 0.0122 0.0950 0.00933 0.0424
(0.00561) (0.0120) (0.449) (0.00982) (0.102)
Log(income-12) -0.475 -0.0566 3.517 -0.283 1.013
(0.732) (0.760) (19.10) (0.785) (4.138)
Baseline Blood Pressure -0.0958*** -0.204** -0.836 -0.187** -0.449
(0.0335) (0.0966) (3.591) (0.0777) (0.870)
Observations 708 735 735 708 708
Include Health Variables Yes No No Yes Yes
Include Town Variables Yes No Yes No Yes
Sample: Farming
Change in SF36 score -0.202 18.84 83.37 14.66 47.36
(0.550) (21.16) (320.7) (13.03) (94.31)
Age 0.0166 0.211 1.029 0.245 0.831
(0.0542) (0.252) (3.975) (0.216) (1.651)
Female ratio 0.00360 0.0443 0.184 0.0312 0.0960
(0.00859) (0.0500) (0.697) (0.0313) (0.196)
Log(income-12) -0.412 0.981 5.522 0.335 2.239
(0.763) (1.853) (22.44) (1.284) (5.862)
Baseline Blood Pressure -0.0381 -0.224 -0.603 -0.154 -0.284
(0.0628) (0.214) (2.148) (0.129) (0.540)
Observations 541 566 566 541 541
Include Health Variables Yes No No Yes Yes
Include Town Variables Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Outcome variable is the percentage change in annual income (%).
All regressions include basic individual characteristics and use PS weighting.
“Health variables” include salt control, fat control, anti-hypertension drug
usage, and inpatient records. “Town variables” include the number of resi-
dents in the town and the distance from the town to county seat. “Farming”
refers to individuals who are engaged in agriculture work. “Not Disabled”
refers to individuals whose physical ability are not severely limited due to
diseases. Robust standard errors are clustered at village level. Significance
level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.11: Effect of Health on Labor Productivity and Time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Overall ∆ Productivity1 ∆ Productivity2 ∆ LaborTime
Sample: Farming
Change in BP -0.0870*** -0.0378* -0.0442** -0.00182
(0.0337) (0.0204) (0.0202) (0.0202)
Observations 568 568 568 568
Sample: Not Disabled
Change in BP -0.0828** -0.0301* -0.0281 -0.00408
(0.0323) (0.0178) (0.0177) (0.0177)
Observations 735 735 735 735
Sample: All
Change in BP -0.0553* -0.0299** -0.0244* -0.00454
(0.0301) (0.0144) (0.0140) (0.0142)
Observations 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077
Notes: The outcome variable for column (1) is the changes in the overall index for the
influence of disease on work. It takes the value between -4 and 4. The smaller the number,
the worse the influence. The outcome variables for column (2)-(4) are the changes in the
time index and productivity index 1 and 2, all of which take the value of -1, 0 and 1.
A value of 1 indicates improved labor productivity or longer labor time compared to the
previous year; -1 indicates reduced productivity or decreased time; 0 indicate no changes.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.0 DOES NON-EMPLOYMENT BASED HEALTH INSURANCE
PROMOTE ENTREPRENEURSHIP? EVIDENCE FROM A POLICY
EXPERIMENT IN CHINA
This chapter is coauthored with Yuting Zhang.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Previous researchers have shown that employment-based health insurance affects job mobility
and deters entrepreneurship (Gruber and Madrian, 2002; Wellington, 2001; Fairlie et al.,
2011; Velamuri, 2012). In particular, the fear of losing health insurance coverage discourages
workers from switching jobs or starting their own business, which creates “job lock” or
“entrepreneurship lock.”1 In this paper, we exploit an exogenous policy experiment in urban
China to evaluate whether the introduction of a non-employer provided insurance promotes
entrepreneurship.
Before 2007, the majority of working-age adults in urban China obtained their health
insurance through an employer-provided insurance program, and most self-employed and
unemployed were uninsured. In an effort to provide universal healthcare coverage, the Chi-
nese government launched the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) program
in 2007 in pilot cities and fully established it by the end of 2009. URBMI is a voluntary
non-employer provided health insurance program that primarily provides coverage for urban
residents without formal employment, including the unemployed, the self-employed, young
1Although “job lock” is usually a more general term, we use “job lock” and “entrepreneurship lock”
interchangeably in this paper. Entrepreneurship lock refers to the barrier of becoming entrepreneurs. We
are using this term to be consistent with the literature.
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children and students. As of 2012, URBMI covered 271.2 million urban residents, accounting
for 20.1% of the Chinese population.
We take advantage of this healthcare reform to evaluate the effect of URBMI, a non-
employer sponsored insurance, on labor market outcomes, in particular, entrepreneurial
decisions. We hypothesize that the implementation of URBMI increases the rate of self-
employment. Before the implementation of URBMI, insurance options for self-employed
individuals were limited, and workers may be reluctant to quit their jobs in order to keep
their employer-sponsored health insurance. With URBMI, insurance no longer acts as a
barrier that prevents workers from transitioning into self-employment.
In this paper, we examine the impact of URBMI on self-employment status, using a
difference-in-differences strategy and the 2000-2011 China Health and Nutrition Survey
(CHNS) data. We exploit the fact that only urban residents with urban Hukou, a legal
record in the Chinese household registration system indicating formal urban residential sta-
tus, were eligible for URBMI during our study period. We compare the change in self-
employment propensity of urban Hukou residents following the implementation of URBMI
with the concurrent change among urban residents without urban Hukou who were not el-
igible for URBMI. We found that URBMI increased self-employment rate by 5.4% for the
overall population, 4.6% for less educated individuals (12 years of schooling or less) and
7.7% for middle age workers (between 30 and 50 years old). For more educated individuals,
younger workers and senior workers, this effect is minimal.
Our study has two distinctive contributions. First, we are the first to evaluate the effects
of China’s new Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) on labor market outcomes,
in particular, entrepreneurial decisions. A few studies have formally evaluated URBMI’s
take-up rate and the effect on healthcare utilization, but to the best of our knowledge, no
study has evaluated URBMI’s effect on labor market outcomes. For instance, Lin et al. (2009)
conducted a national household survey of nine representative Chinese cities, and found that
there is a U-shape relationship between the URBMI participation rate and income, with
the poor and those with prior hospitalizations benefiting most from URBMI. Liu and Zhao
(2014) found that URBMI significantly increased the utilization of formal medical services,
and Wang (2014) found that URBMI increased household-level healthcare utilization. Pan
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et al. (2015) concluded that URBMI beneficiaries experienced better health and received
better inpatient care, than the uninsured.
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on entrepreneurship lock, by taking ad-
vantage of an exogenous policy change that disconnects employment and health insurance.
Previous literature on job lock mainly focuses on employer-to-employer mobility (Madrian,
1994; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1996; Kapur, 1998), and only few studies (Fairlie et al., 2011; DeCi-
cca, 2010; Heim and Lurie, 2010) have investigated the impact on self-employment choices.
Our work shows that breaking the link between health insurance and employment can in-
crease self-employment rates and promote entrepreneurship, but this effect varies for different
populations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the institutional
background on the Chinese healthcare system. Section 3.3 presents the data source and
study variables. Section 3.4 illustrates the empirical strategies. Section 3.5 shows the main
results, and Section 3.6 discusses our results and concludes.
3.2 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The Chinese health insurance system consists of three main components: the Urban Em-
ployee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI), the Urban Residents Basic Medical Insurance
(URBMI), and the New Cooperative Medical System (NCMS). In addition to these gov-
ernment programs, some commercial health insurance programs exist but are in their early
stages and mainly target the upper class (Dong, 2009). In 2007, less than 4% of individual
medical expenses were paid by commercial health insurance in China, compared to the 50%
in the United States (Wang, 2009).
UEBMI, formally launched in 1998, provides health insurance to urban residents with
current or previous employment from both private and public enterprises. According to the
Ministry of Health (2013), 264.7 million individuals were enrolled in UEBMI as of 2012,
accounting for 19.6% of the total population in China. UEBMI is financed by premium
contributions from employers (6%-8% of the employee’s wage) and employees (2%-3% of
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their wage). Retired workers’ premium contributions are fully born by their former employers
(Liu, 2002). This insurance scheme has two components, an integrated social pooling fund
and individual medical savings accounts. The social pooling fund is used for inpatient care.
It is largely pooled at the municipal level, so the benefit level does not vary by employers.
The mandated reimbursement rate varies slightly from city to city. Liang and Langenbrunner
(2013) estimated the nationwide effective reimbursement rate for inpatient care was 88.5%
in 2011. The individual medical savings accounts are used to cover outpatient services,
deductibles, and any copayments paid by enrollees. The decision to offer UEBMI to workers
is made by employers rather than employees (Xu et al., 2007). Once offered, all employees
typically choose to enroll because of the generous employer subsidy.
UEBMI was designed for urban residents with official urban Hukou. Recently, some
cities have expanded to make UEBMI cover migrant workers with formal employment—
residents who have formal employment in the urban areas but with rural Hukou. However,
the 2013 enrollment data shows that only 18.7% of the rural migrant workers had urban
health insurance nationwide (Jiang and Yi, 2014), and during our study period between
2000 and 2011, the proportion was smaller than 7% on average.
URBMI was initially piloted in 2007 for selected cities and expanded to almost all cities
by the end of 2009 (Liu and Zhao, 2014). This is a voluntary program that primarily pro-
vides health insurance for urban Hukou residents without formal employment, including the
unemployed, the self-employed, young children and school students. According to Ministry
of Health (2013), as of 2012, URBMI covered 271.2 million urban residents, accounting for
20.1% of total Chinese population. Prior to the implementation of URBMI, most of the un-
employed and self-employed were uninsured, while young children and school students were
usually covered by special insurance programs such as the Expanded Program of Immuniza-
tion Insurance for Children.
URBMI mainly offers reimbursement for inpatient expenses, but it also covers some out-
patient services for costly chronic or catastrophic diseases, like radiotherapy and chemother-
apy for cancer (Liu and Zhao, 2014). Although State Council (2012) noted that the target
reimbursement rate for inpatient care under URBMI was 70% in 2012, Liang and Langen-
brunner (2013) estimated that the actual nationwide effective reimbursement rate in 2011
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was only around 42%, because many services provided in the hospital are not reimbursable.
URBMI is financed by subsidies from central and local governments (about 36% of the financ-
ing cost on average), and individual contributions (Lin et al., 2009). The annual premium
for pilot cities in 2010 was between 20 and 170 CNY in central and western provinces and
between 40 and 250 CNY in eastern provinces, so the program is affordable to the general
public (Yip et al., 2012). Local governments have autonomy in designing and implementing
URBMI according to their local needs, and therefore the local subsidy amount and reim-
bursement rates vary by city. Unlike UEBMI, URBMI does not have individual Medical
Savings Account.
NCMS was established in 2003 to replace the old village-based rural health insurance
program which targets rural Hukou residents. NCMS is a voluntary scheme, but the central
and local governments provide substantial contributions to make it attractive even to low-risk
households. As of 2012, the participation rate of NCMS was 98.26%, covering 805.3 million
rural residents or 59.6% of the total Chinese population (Ministry of Health, 2013). Like
URBMI, NCMS also mainly offers reimbursement for inpatient services, but each county can
set their own benefit schemes and some aﬄuent counties choose to cover outpatient services.
In general, the level of financing is low, the coverage is shallow, but the premiums are low
as well. The minimum per beneficiary contribution in 2010 was between 20 and 30 CNY in
western and central provinces, and between 30 and 50 CNY in eastern provinces. Average
inpatient reimbursement rate in 2010 was 43.9%, and 78.8% of the counties covered general
outpatient care (Yip et al., 2012). These rates have increased substantially in recent years
but we report the numbers relevant to our study period.
Recently there have been efforts to combine URBMI and NCMS to create a unified
health insurance system for both rural and urban Hukou residents without employer-provided
insurance (State Council, 2016). During our study period, however, there were only a few
pilot cities participating in the unified program, none of which are in our sample.
In sum, before the implementation of URBMI, rural Hukou residents were mainly in-
sured through NCMS, a non-employment based insurance program, while urban Hukou
residents were largely insured through UEBMI, an employer-provided insurance program.
Self-employed city residents with rural Hukou could choose to enroll in NCMS in their local
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towns, but self-employed city residents with urban Hukou did not have a similar government-
subsidized insurance program. The latter could choose to buy commercial insurance but there
was only limited supply of commercial insurance and it was usually considered unaffordable
by many. After URBMI was initiated, the self-employed and the unemployed urban Hukou
residents gained access to affordable health insurance through URBMI.
3.3 DATA
3.3.1 Data Source and Pattern
We use five waves of the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) data: 2000, 2004, 2006,
2009, and 2011. CHNS is a nationally representative dataset that covers both urban and
rural areas, collected by the Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill and the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Center
for Disease Control and Prevention (Zhang et al., 2014). We exclude data from rural sites
because our area of focus is the urban labor market, and China’s rural labor markets are
dramatically different from its urban labor markets. Most rural residents are self-employed
farmers, who are very different from the self-employed workers in the cities. Before 2011, this
survey was conducted in nine provinces including Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong,
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou. In the 2011 wave, Beijing, Shanghai, and
Chongqing were added. We exclude these late additions from our analysis. CHNS is a panel
dataset and the same individuals were interviewed in each wave. The annual attrition rate
is around 30% and new individuals were added to maintain the representativeness of the
sample (See Appendix C for a detailed discussion on attrition and data representativeness).
Our main outcome is the self-employment status in each wave (1=currently self-employed;
0=wage-earners). Survey subjects report their primary and secondary employment status by
choosing one of the following options: self-employed with employees, self-employed with no
employees, workers for another person or enterprise, temporary workers, contract workers,
paid and unpaid family business workers, or other. We define the first two categories—
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self-employed with and without employees—to be self-employed individuals. Workers for
another person or enterprise, temporary workers, and contract workers are categorized as
wage/salary workers. The remaining categories consist only 2.7% of the entire sample, and
are excluded.2 Before the implementation of URBMI in 2000, 2004 and 2006 waves, the
overall self-employment rate was 35.91%; 63.21% of wage/salary workers were covered by
some type of health insurance while only 13.26% of self-employed workers were insured.
After the implementation of URBMI, in our 2009 and 2011 waves, 91.72% of wage earners
and 89.14% of self-employed workers were insured.
We categorize insurance types into employer-provided insurance, URBMI, commercial
insurance, and other insurance.3 Our hypothesis is that the implementation of URBMI
promotes self-employment through alleviating entrepreneurship lock. In order to show the
direct link between employer-provided health insurance and self-employment decisions, we
focus briefly on individuals who are currently wage/salary workers in each wave, and track
whether they transit to self-employment in the next wave. Table 3.1 reports the transition
rate by health insurance types. We define the transition rate as the proportion of wage/salary
earners in one wave who became self-employed in the next wave. This is done for all consec-
utive waves: 2000-2004, 2004-2006, 2006-2009, and 2009-2011. For urban Hukou residents,
before the implementation of URBMI, those with employer-provided health insurance are
6.33% less likely to transition to self-employment. This difference disappears after the im-
plementation of URBMI. For rural Hukou residents, the difference in transition rates for
those with and without employer-provided health insurance is evident both before and after
the implementation of URBMI. This suggests that urban Hukou residents are “treated” by
URBMI and rural Hukou residents are not. To test that this pattern is not driven by other
factors that only affect urban Hukou residents, we also compare the transition rates between
2We conduct robustness checks that allow self-employment to include paid and unpaid family business
workers, or consider secondary employment as well as primary employment. The results are very similar.
Thus in the rest of the paper, we only report results using primary employment and excluding family business
workers.
3Employer-provided insurance include Worker’s Compensation and Unified Planning Medical Service in
2000 and 2004, UEBMI Passway Mode, Block Model, or Catastrophic Disease Insurance in 2006, UEBMI in
2009 and 2001, and Free Medical Insurance and Unified Planning Medical Service in these five years. Other
insurance include Insurance for Family Member, Cooperative Insurance, NCMS, Insurance for Women and
Children, Expanded Program of Immunization Insurance for Children, and other.
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individuals with and without non-employer-provided health insurance—URBMI, commercial
insurance, and other insurance. There is no difference between transition rates before and
after the implementation of URBMI for both urban and rural Hukou holders. This evidence
in the raw data suggests that URBMI alleviated entrepreneurship lock. However, since the
linkage rate for this dataset is relatively low and the linked sample is relatively small, we
only consider Table 3.1 as suggestive evidence.
3.3.2 Covariates
Guided by the literature on the empirical studies of entrepreneurship (Le (1999) etc.), we
control for several individual characteristics, including gender, age (and age squared), ed-
ucation (measured by years of schooling)4, marriage status (1 indicating married and 0
otherwise), individual annual income, whether the spouse works, health status, occupa-
tional status, and enterprise type. To measure health status, an indicator of poor health
and disability is created for respondents who indicated they suffered from one of the fol-
lowing conditions: heart disease, diabetes, myocardial infarction, apoplexy, asthma, cancer,
goiter, angular stomatitis, blindness in one or both eye(s), loss of one or both arm(s) or
leg(s), or other chronic diseases. Occupational status is measured by a categorical vari-
able: senior professionals (doctors, professors, lawyers, engineers, etc.), junior professionals
(nurses, teachers, editors, photographers, etc.), administrators/executives/managers, office
staff (secretaries, office helpers, etc.), skilled workers (foremen, group leaders, craftsmen,
etc.), non-skilled workers (ordinary laborers, loggers, etc.), service workers (housekeepers,
cooks, waiters, doorkeepers, hairdressers, salespersons, etc.), army officers and police offi-
cers, drivers, and other occupations. These categories are taken directly from the CHNS
questionnaire and are mutually exclusive. Enterprise type is measured by a categorical
variable as well: state-related enterprises and non-state related. State enterprises include
government departments, state services, and state-owned enterprises; non-state enterprises
include private or individual enterprises, foreign invested enterprises, and others.
4We test alternative indicators, such as the level of completed education, and the results are similar.
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3.4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGIES
3.4.1 Difference-in-Differences Approach
To study the effect of URBMI on self-employment, we utilize a difference-in-differences strat-
egy. We take advantage of the fact that only urban residents with urban Hukou are eligible
for URBMI during our study period. Urban residents with rural Hukou could enroll in NCMS
throughout the entire study period, but the majority of them were not eligible to enroll in
URBMI.5 This enables us to use urban residents with urban Hukou as the treatment group,
and urban residents with rural Hukou as a comparison group.
The key to our identification strategy is the eligibility of obtaining affordable non-
employer provided health insurance, rather than the actual status of having health insurance.
This is because the real issue with job lock is the guarantee of insurance access due to the
adverse selection in the health insurance market (Baker, 2015). If the wage difference be-
tween jobs with and without employer-provided health insurance equals the cost of buying an
equivalent insurance elsewhere, health insurance would have little impact on labor mobility.
However, it can be difficult for workers to purchase equivalent insurance in the individual
market, especially for someone with preexisting conditions. In China, this problem is more
severe since the commercial insurance market was still in the early stages. Rural Hukou resi-
dents can choose to enroll in NCMS in their local towns. For urban Hukou residents without
formal employment, however, affordable insurance program was only made available to them
since 2007 after the implementation of URBMI. Thus, even though both URBMI and NCMS
are voluntary programs, our identification is not jeopardized.
We compare the self-employment rates before and after the implementation of URBMI
among urban residents with and without urban Hukou. The model specification is as follows:6
5In our sample, there are 2% of rural Hukou holders report to have URBMI. Since cities have discretion
over the details of the policy, we can not rule out that no rural Hukou holders are affected by the implemen-
tation of URBMI. However, if a limited amount of rural migrants were affected, we are underestimating the
effect, and the potential bias should be very small. Our model also assume that individuals do not change
their Hukou status. However, about 5% of our sample did change Hukou status during our study period. We
tested the models with these individuals included or excluded, and the results are very similar. We present
the results with them included and use their original status as the Hukou status.
6It is most natural to use a probit or logit regression when the outcome variable is binary. However, using
DID estimators (or any interaction terms) in a non-linear regression will result in non-consistent coefficients
54
1[Self ]it = β0 + β11[Post]it + β21[Hukou]it + β3(1[Post]it × 1[Hukou]it)
+β4Xit + γt + τc + it
(3.1)
where 1[Self ]it is a binary variable with 1 indicating individual i is currently being self-
employed in wave t. 1[Hukou]it represents individual i’s Hukou status in wave t: 1 corre-
sponds to urban and 0 to rural. 1[Post]it equals 1 for waves 2009 and 2011, and 0 for waves
2000, 2004 and 2006. Xit is a vector of control variables discussed in the last section. The
model also includes controls for year fixed effect γt and city fixed effect τc. If the implemen-
tation of URBMI increased self-employment rate, the coefficient of the interaction term (β3)
should be positive.
We show the parallel trend between urban Hukou residents and rural Hukou residents in
Figure 3.1. We run a similar regression as Equation 3.1 but without the DID terms, then
plot the average values of the residuals for urban and rural Hukou residents respectively. It
is clear that the two groups had similar trends before the implementation of URBMI. Rural
Hukou residents had a higher self-employment rate than their urban counterparts. This
is consistent with the fact that rural Hukou residents had non-employer provided health
insurance (NCMS) while urban Hukou residents did not. After 2009, urban Hukou residents
gained access to a non-employment based insurance scheme, and the self-employment rates
of the two groups converged.
3.4.2 Falsification Tests and Sensitivity Analysis
Several potential issues arise when estimating equation 3.1. The key identification assump-
tion is that changes in self-employment rate would be the same for residents with rural or
urban Hukou in the absence of URBMI. However, there might be changes in the economy
during our study period that affected self-employment propensity differently for rural and
(Ai and Norton, 2003). We calculated the marginal effect of the interaction terms in a probit model for our
main results using the method in Norton et al. (2004): ∆
2Prob(Self=1)
∆Post∆Hukou = Φ(β1 + β2 + β3 + Covβ)− Φ(β1 +
Covβ) − Φ(β2 + Covβ) + Φ(Covβ) where Covβ = β0 + β4X + γt + τc. Similar results are obtained, which
suggests that any biases related to the use of linear models are likely to be small. Thus, we only report
results from linear probability model since it is much less cumbersome to report.
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urban Hukou residents. In addition, rural Hukou holders may not be comparable to urban
Hukou holders. We use several strategies to address these concerns.
First, we utilize a propensity score method with an inverse probability of treatment
weighting (IPTW) to balance the characteristics of urban residents with rural and urban
Hukou (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Hirano and Imbens, 2001; Hirano et al., 2003). In
calculating the propensity scores, we account for individual-level characteristics mentioned
above using a logistic regression to estimate the probability of being urban Hukou holders.
We then assign a weight to each observation that is the inverse of the estimated propensity
score of the individual’s assignment to its group. We report estimation results with and
without propensity score weighting in Section 3.5.
Second, we include individual fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant indi-
vidual characteristics. We report estimation results with and without individual fixed effect
in Section 3.5 as well.
Third, we add to our covariates provincial macroeconomic indicators that may affect
self-employment behaviors for each corresponding year. These indicators include the gross
regional product of the province, urban population size, unemployment rate, value-added of
production and manufacture industry, and the value of import and export of the province.
We only use provincial level variables rather than a finer geographic classification, since city
information is censored due to privacy concerns. We combine data from China National
Statistics Bureau and CHNS to conduct our analysis.7 In this model, standard errors are
clustered at the provincial level.
Forth, we are concerned that changes in self-employment propensity may be driven by
changes in the composition of rural Hukou holders, since some of the rural Hukou holders
are migrants from rural areas. To formally test for this potential bias, we follow methods
in Rossin-Slater et al. (2013) and run several falsification tests. We estimate models similar
to our main specification but replace the original outcome variable, self-employment status,
with the following outcomes: age, education, logarithms of individual annual income, and
7There are some concerns about the quality of China’s macroeconomics statistics, especially at the provin-
cial level. Provinces have incentives to over-report their economic performances. Rawski (2001) found that
the sum of provincial GDP data is larger than the national data calculated by China National Statistics
Bureau. However, we include in our model year and city fixed effect, so this bias is greatly mitigated.
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gender. If the interaction term does not have a significant effect on these outcome variables,
it suggests that our main results are not being driven by compositional changes due to
selected migration.
Finally, we include an alternative empirical strategy that only looks at urban Hukou in-
dividuals, and show that job lock existed before 2009 but disappeared after 2009 (see details
in Appendix D). We focus on the transition from a salaried position to self-employment,
and use two difference-in-differences models separately for the two periods before and after
the implementation of URBMI. We estimate the entrepreneurship barrier using a strat-
egy following Holtz-Eakin et al. (1996) and Fairlie et al. (2011): comparing the effect of
employment-based insurance on self-employment transition rate between those with low and
high demand for the employment-based health insurance. Because the sample size is signif-
icantly smaller when we only focus on individuals who transitioned from salaried positions
to self-employment, we do not report this as main results and only illustrate the details of
this strategy and report its results in the appendix.
3.4.3 Heterogeneous Effects
To show the heterogeneous effects of this policy change, we conduct analysis for several
subgroups—males v.s. female, more educated individuals (> 12 years of education) v.s. less
educated (≤ 12), and young workers (aged < 30) v.s. middle age workers (aged 30-50)
v.s. senior workers (aged > 50). We hypothesize that individuals should be affected by the
implementation of URBMI less if their health care costs are relatively small compared to
their wage income. Thus, the estimated marginal effect (β3) for younger workers and more
educated individuals should be smaller, since younger workers have smaller health care cost
and more educated individuals usually have higher wage income.
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3.5 RESULTS
3.5.1 Comparing Characteristics between Study Groups
Summary statistics of covariates for urban and rural Hukou residents are shown in Panel A of
Table 3.2.8 Panel A shows that, on average, rural Hukou individuals are less educated, have
lower income, and are much more likely to be non-skilled workers and service workers. We
use a propensity score method with an inverse probability of treatment weighting, among
other strategies, to address this issue. We compare the weighted characteristics for each
group and report them in Panel B of Table 3.2. After weighting, all key characteristics are
balanced at 5% significance level.
3.5.2 The Effect of URBMI on Self-Employment
Table 3.3 shows the main results from the difference-in-differences model that compares self-
employment rate among urban residents with and without urban Hukou, in the post-policy
period relative to the pre-policy period. The marginal effect of the implementation of URBMI
on self-employment status ranges from 5.36% to 8.34% under different specifications for the
overall population. This suggests that the implementation of this non-employment based
insurance increases more self-employment activities for urban Hukou residents by at least 5.36
percentage points, compared to rural Hukou residents. The baseline self-employment rate
was 35.9 percentage points, resulting in a 14.9% (5.36/35.9) URBMI related self-employment
rate increase.
Without the inclusion of propensity score weighting or individual fixed effect, the mag-
nitude of the marginal effect is 7.42%, which is slightly larger than the magnitude with the
inclusion of propensity score weighting (5.39%) or individual fixed effect (5.36%). Comparing
column (1) and (2), we can see that the magnitude is smaller with the inclusion of provincial
level macroeconomic indicators. Overall, the results are robust and statistically significant.
We present the results of falsification tests in Table 3.4. We conduct these tests in order
8We report the population share of certain occupation for the seven major categories that contain at least
5% of the population, since it is cumbersome to report all categories.
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to rule out the possible endogeneity issue due to selected migration from rural areas to the
city. None of the coefficients of the interaction term 1[Post]it × 1[Hukou]it are significant,
which indicates that the main results in Table 3.3 are not driven by compositional changes
due to selected migration.
3.5.3 Heterogeneous Effects
We examine the heterogeneous effects of this policy change and conduct sensitivity analysis
for different sub-groups. Compared to female workers, male workers received a larger impact
from the implementation of URBMI: 6.81% with propensity score weighting and 6.30% with
individual fixed effect, as shown in Table 3.3. Results for other subgroups are shown in
Figure 3.2. Consistent with our hypothesis, only the self-employment propensities of less
educated individuals (high school and below) are affected by the implementation of URBMI
(4.56%), but more educated individuals are not affected at all. Among different age groups,
only middle age workers (between 30 and 50 years old) are significantly affected by this policy
change (7.73%). For senior workers, the effect is not significant, and for young workers, the
point estimate is negative.
3.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We find strong evidence that the implementation of a non-employment based health insur-
ance, URBMI, promotes entrepreneurship in the urban labor market in China. Comparing
urban residents with and without urban Hukou, we find that the implementation of URBMI
increased the self-employment rate by 5.4 percentage points, or a relative 14.9% for the overall
population. The effect of URBMI varies for different sub-groups. For more educated indi-
viduals, younger workers and senior workers, there are minimal changes in self-employment
activities. For less educated individuals and middle age workers, URBMI significantly in-
creased their self-employment propensities. The heterogeneous effects are consistent with
our hypotheses and with previous literature.
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Hamersma and Kim (2009) shows that the magnitude of job lock potentially decreases
with income, thus the effect of a non-employer provided health insurance program would
increase self-employment propensity more for lower wage income earners. This is because
employment benefits, such as employer-provided health insurance, can have larger effects on
job mobility for workers with lower wage payment. Since we only have individuals’ current
income, but not their potential wage income, we use education level as an indicator. The
result is consistent: more educated individuals, potentially with higher wage income, are not
affected by the implementation of URBMI, while less educated ones are.
We also observe that only middle age workers (between 30 and 50 years old) are sig-
nificantly affected by this policy change. It is not surprising that employer-provided health
insurance has little impact on younger workers because their health costs are low. For
older workers, although their health cost is high, a non-employer provided health insurance
would mainly affect their decision to retire, rather than switching between wage sector and
self-employment sector.
The U.S. government also has taken a number of measures to mitigate job lock, like
Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) and Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accounting Act in 1996 (HIPPA). Papers examining the effect of these policies
reached different conclusions. Bailey (2013) found that the expansion of dependent coverage
under the Affordable Care Act did not increase job mobility for young adults. On the other
hand, Fairlie et al. (2011) found a nearly 3.1% increase in business ownership that can be
explained by the new Medicare eligibility when individuals turn 65. DeCicca (2010) also
suggested that the implementation of New Jersey’s 1993 Individual Health Coverage Plan
that partially disconnected health insurance and employment increased self-employment rate.
The results seem contradicting, but they can be explained by the heterogeneous effects of job
lock, consistent with what we showed in our paper. Job lock can be a minor issue for younger
workers who are the study population in Bailey (2013), but it can be a major concern for
less privileged population and workers who bear higher health cost as in Fairlie et al. (2011).
Our study is one of the few papers (Lin et al., 2009; Liu and Zhao, 2014; Wang, 2014; Pan
et al., 2015) to evaluate the effects of the China’s new Urban Resident Basic Health Insurance
plan, and the first to look at its impact on entrepreneurship, or labor market outcome in
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general. By studying this exogenous quasi-natural policy experiment, we also contribute to
the literature on job lock caused by employment-based health insurance. We conclude that
breaking the link between employment and health insurance can promote entrepreneurship,
an outcome that could inform policy making in many other countries.
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Figure 3.1: Parallel Trends for Urban and Rural Hukou Residents
Note: We run a similar regression as Equation 3.1 but without the DID terms, then plot the average values
of the residuals for urban and rural Hukou residents respectively.
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Figure 3.2: Heterogeneous Effect of URBMI
Note: This table reports treatment effects of the interaction term on self-employment status for different
sub-groups, together with the 95% confidence intervals. Model specification is the one with individual fixed
effect and with provincial level macro covariates. “More educated” refers to individuals with more than 12
years of schooling. “Young” refers to individuals below 30 years old, and “Senior” refers to above 50 years
old. Robust standard errors are clustered at the province level. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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Table 3.1: Employment to Self-employment Transition Rates (%) by Insurance Status
Urban Hukou Rural Hukou
Pre-policy Post-policy Pre-policy Post-policy
Panel A: Employer-provided Health Insurance (EPHI)
(1) With EPHI 2.76 4.08 3.13 0.00
(2) Without EPHI 9.09 6.25 28.13 20.00
(3) Difference: (2)-(1) 6.33*** 2.17 25.00*** 20.00**
Panel B: Non Employer-provided Health Insurance (Non-EPHI)
(4) With Non-EPHI 3.53 7.14 20.59 19.20
(5) Without Non-EPHI 5.54 3.94 26.60 11.11
(6) Difference (5)-(4) 2.01 3.20 6.01 -8.09
Total Counts 1449 518 264 145
Notes: Transition rate is defined as the proportion of new self-employed individu-
als among the original wage-workers. Pre-policy refers to 2000-2004, 2004-2006 and
2006-2009 panels; Post-policy is the 2009-2011 panel. We conduct t-test for compar-
ison between pre and post policy period in row (3) and (6). Significance level: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.2: Comparative Statistics for City Residents with Rural and Urban Hukou
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rural Hukou Urban Hukou Difference Observations
Panel A: Without Weighting
Age (year) 41.60 40.83 0.78** 8268
Female Share (%) 46.20 43.43 2.77* 8280
Education (year) 7.24 11.18 -3.93*** 7904
Marriage Rate (%) 85.20 82.05 3.15*** 8197
Poor Health (%) 15.36 16.01 -0.65 8280
Log(Income) 7.23 8.75 -1.52*** 8280
Spouse Works (%) 67.61 57.13 10.48*** 8280
Senior Professional (%) 0.60 11.61 -11.00*** 8265
Junior Professional (%) 1.61 8.98 -7.37*** 8265
Administrator (%) 2.48 11.34 -8.86*** 8265
Office Staff (%) 2.28 13.14 -10.86*** 8265
Skilled Worker (%) 6.00 13.63 -7.64*** 8265
Non-skilled Worker (%) 11.16 11.27 -0.11 8265
Police or Army (%) 0.23 0.97 -0.73*** 8265
Driver (%) 3.72 4.07 -0.35 8265
Service Worker (%) 11.90 17.25 -5.35*** 8265
Panel B: With Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting
Age (year) 40.38 41.28 0.90* 8268
Female Share (%) 43.57 43.79 0.22 8280
Education (year) 9.64 9.60 -0.04 7904
Marriage Rate (%) 80.10 82.88 1.78* 8197
Poor Health (%) 15.52 15.80 0.28 8280
Log(Income) 8.16 8.17 0.01 8280
Spouse Works (%) 56.27 59.98 3.71* 8280
Senior Professional (%) 5.35 7.41 2.06 8265
Junior Professional (%) 6.38 6.10 -0.72 8265
Administrator (%) 8.16 8.11 -0.05 8265
Office Staff (%) 9.61 9.05 -0.56 8265
Skilled Worker (%) 10.60 10.50 -0.10 8265
Non-skilled Worker (%) 11.63 11.30 -0.27 8265
Police or Army (%) 0.56 0.63 -0.07 8265
Driver (%) 3.99 3.93 -0.06 8265
Service Worker (%) 16.27 15.73 -0.54 8265
Notes: All samples are for adult residents living in urban areas. Panel A re-
ports results without the weighting, and Panel B reports results with inverse
probability of treatment weighting. Significance level in t-test: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.3: Marginal Effect of URBMI on Self-Employment Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UrbanHukou*Post with Individual FE 0.0536** 0.0649*** 0.0630* 0.0361*
(0.0218) (0.0175) (0.0297) (0.0189)
UrbanHukou*Post with IPTW 0.0539 0.0623** 0.0681 0.0425
(0.0473) (0.0270) (0.0572) (0.0630)
UrbanHukou*Post 0.0742** 0.0834*** 0.0766* 0.0694*
(0.0315) (0.0150) (0.0357) (0.0354)
Observations 7,801 7,801 4,359 3,442
Baseline Dependent Mean 0.3591 0.3591 0.3354 0.3873
Macro Variables Yes No Yes Yes
Sample All All Male Female
Notes: Dependent variable is SELF , an indicator for self-employment. This table reports
treatment effects of the interaction term on self-employment status, with inverse probability
of treatment weights using propensity scores (IPTW), with individual fixed effect (Individual
FE), and in the absence of weighting and individual fixed effect. All specifications include
year and city fixed effects. “Macro Variable” include gross regional product of the province
(in 100 million RMB), urban population size, unemployed population, value-added of second
industry, and the value of import and export from that province. For models that include
“Macro Variable”, robust standard errors are clustered at the province level. Significance
level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4: Falsification Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age Education log(Income) Female
UrbanHukou*Post -0.416 -0.0144 -0.316 -0.0229
(0.596) (0.151) (0.237) (0.0213)
Observations 7,801 7,801 7,801 7,801
Notes: This table presents the treatment effect of the interaction term
(having urban Hukou and in post policy period) on various outcome
variables as falsification tests. The estimated models are similar to our
main specification in equation 3.1, but with different outcome variables.
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.0 ENTREPRENEURSHIP OR NECESSITY? CREDIT CONSTRAINT
AND SELF-EMPLOYMENT IN CHINA
4.1 INTRODUCTION
According to traditional economic models, entrepreneurship spurs innovation, creates jobs,
and promotes overall economic activity (Schumpeter, 1934). More recently, however, econo-
mists have come to suggest that traditional thinking about entrepreneurial activity is overly
optimistic, particularly in developing countries, where often people turn to self-employ-
ment when other employment opportunities are scarce or non-existent (Acs, 2006). Self-
employment rate, the most common measures of entrepreneurship, fails to distinguish differ-
ent types of entrepreneurs. A self-employed worker can be an opportunity entrepreneur, who
fits the traditional economic model, exploits new opportunities and improves product; or
he/she can be a necessity entrepreneur or entrepreneur by default, who uses self-employment
as a last resort when regular jobs become scarce or pay poorly. The importance of this dis-
tinction lies in its welfare implication. While a rising population of opportunity entrepreneurs
may accelerate economic growth, higher rate of necessity entrepreneurs can simply indicate
that the economy is creating too few conventional wage-earning jobs. Thus, it is essential
to discuss the effect of some commonly used policy tools on different types of entrepreneurs,
such as improving the access to credit and financial market.
Credit constraint is often considered a major deterrent to the formation of self-employ-
ment (Taylor, 2001). This paper analyzes different types of self-employment in urban China,
and examines how a major policy change, China’s 2007 Property Rights Law that improved
the access to credit, affects the formation of different types of businesses. Utilize China
Health and Nutrition Survey and Chinese Private Enterprises Survey data, and difference-in-
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difference models, I investigate whether the improvement of credit constraint is internalized
by these two types of self-employed workers in their labor market decisions.
China provides an excellent laboratory for this analysis because of the presence of large
heterogeneity among self-employed workers, the recent rise of the private sector, and the
exogenous change in policy that relax the credit constraint. Official statistics show the
number of self-employed workers in urban China increased from 0.15 million in 1978, the
beginning of the economic transition, to 61.42 million in 2013. Some of the newly self-
employed are true entrepreneurs seeking opportunities in the transition economy, but others
are forced into self-employment out of necessity. There are also striking regional variations
in the level of economics development and self-employment rate. These variations, both over
time and across regions, enable me to estimate the impact of policy interventions statistically.
In this paper, I first establish a model of employment decision that incorporates credit
constraint and employee hiring choices. At equilibrium, individuals who choose self-employ-
ment are separated into two distinctive types: the ones with highest ability and the ones
with the lowest. These two types of self-employed workers correspond to the notion of
opportunity entrepreneurs and necessity entrepreneurs. My model also predicts that high
ability entrepreneurs hire labor while low ability entrepreneurs do not.1 Thus, empirically, I
separate urban self-employed workers into two types — self-employed own-account workers
and self-employed owner-managers with paid employee(s). This separation criteria is also
used in Earle and Sakova (2000), showing that in six transition economies, owner-managers
with employees tend to be true entrepreneurs, but at least some own-account workers are
somehow constrained and are involuntarily self-employed.
I then examine the impact of credit constraints on the formation of different types of
private businesses by looking at the differences before and after the passage of the 2007
Property Rights Law. For small businesses in China, the type of assets which can be used as
collateral is heavily restricted. This constraint was relaxed in 2007, when China’s Property
Rights Law was enacted. The law expands the scope of collateral that can be used by
borrowers to secure loans. To obtain the causal effect of this relaxation of credit constraints,
1Models by Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) and Van Praag and Cramer (2001), among the others, also link
entrepreneurship to labor demand, predicting a positive relationship between entrepreneurial ability and the
number of employees they hire.
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I employ a difference-in-differences strategy, comparing the differences in self-employment
rate before and after 2007, and for provinces with different marketization levels. I use the
Index of Marketization by Fan et al. (2003) as the measure of the marketization level. I found
that the relaxation of credit constraint significantly increases the formation of opportunity
entrepreneurs, but has little impact on necessity entrepreneurs.
My study has two distinctive contributions. First, it contributes to the credit constraint
literature that examines the individual-level decision to enter into entrepreneurship. Carpen-
ter and Petersen (2002) and Banerjee and Duflo (2014), among the others, found evidence
of severe credit constraint for private businesses. I took advantage of a nationwide policy
change to provide more empirical evidence on whether the improvement of credit constraint
through collateral is internalized by self-employed workers.
Second, I address the heterogeneity among self-employed workers. More specifically, I
separate them into necessity entrepreneurs and opportunity entrepreneurs, and formalize
it in a theoretical model. I then examine the heterogeneous effect of credit constraint on
them. Necessity entrepreneurs prevail in less developed countries, where self-employment
rate is higher than developed countries (Parker, 2004). La Porta and Shleifer (2008) pre-
sented evidence that many of the self-employed in developing countries run low-productivity,
commonplace businesses. Mohapatra et al. (2007) evaluated the role of self-employment in
China’s rural economy, finding that self-employers with low level of capital invested tend
to be necessity entrepreneurs. Tokman (1992) also showed that in Latin America, self-
employment is primarily a refuge for people that are excluded from formal labor markets. In
my paper, I found that credit constraint is a major deterrent for opportunity entrepreneurs,
but not so much for necessity entrepreneurs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 introduces the institutional
background and the passage of the 2007 Property Rights. Section 4.3 constructs a model
and present propositions on the impact of credit constraint. Section 4.4 discusses data
source and presents the basic patterns in the study population. Section 4.4 also analyzes
the characteristics of the two types of self-employment. Section 4.5 presents the empirical
strategies and 4.6 the corresponding results. Section 4.7 discusses the results and concludes.
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4.2 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Credit constraint and the lack of access to formal sources of external finance are often
considered as a major deterrent to business formation around the world (?). In China, one
peculiar problem for small businesses is that the type of assets which can be used as collaterals
is heavily restricted. According to Han (2007), while 70% of small business financing was
secured by movable property in the U.S., the figure for China was less than 15%. World
Bank (2007) estimated that small and medium sized enterprises and farmers in China have
approximately $2 trillion in “dead capital” – assets that can not be used to generate loans
to fund investment and growth.
Rules regarding collateral requirements in China are established in 1995 through the
Collateral Law. Twenty years later, following legislative debates that had lasted for over a
decade, China passed its first Property Rights Law. This Property Rights law was passed on
March 16, 2007 and went into effect in October 1, 2007.2 The 2007 Property Law emphasizes,
for the first time, the equal protection of state, collective and individual property. Moreover,
it reforms the collateral requirements, and relaxes the credit constraint for entrepreneurs in
three major ways.
First, the law expands the scope of collaterals that can be used by borrowers to secure
loans (Marechal et al., 2009; Berkowitz et al., 2015; Du, 2010). It enables borrowers to
use a broader level of movable collateral, such as present and future-acquired equipment
inventory, accounts receivable and a combination of assets (Clause 181). For example, in the
1995 Collateral Law, only properties proved by law or regulation can be used as collaterals;
correspondingly, the 2007 Property Rights Law states in Clause 180 that “properties other
than those that shall not be mortgaged according to any law or administrative regulation”
can be used as collateral. Second, the law improves the process and simplifies the formalities
required to obtain a loan. Third, the law reduces the liquidation cost for banks which
incentivizes them to lend (Liu, 2008). For example, previously, when the obligor fails to
2On December 29, 2006, the 25th session of the 10th standing committee of the National People’s Congress
accepted a draft of the Property Rights Law of the People’s Republic of China. Once the Standing Committee
approved the draft of the law, its formal passage was almost a done deal. Berkowitz et al. (2015) showed
that the pass of this law came as a surprise, because at the time it was uncertain whether the law would go
forward to the full session of the National People’s Congress.
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pay his/her due debts and the mortgagee and the mortgagor fail to conclude an agreement
on the means of realizing the right to mortgage, the mortgagee need to go through lengthy
law suits. However, Clause 195 of the Property Law states that in these scenarios, the
mortgagee may request the people’s court to auction or sell off the property under mortgage.
This improvement is recognized by the World Bank: China moved up 20 places (out of 181
economies) on the “Getting Credit – Legal Rights” ranking in its Doing Business Index in
2008.
4.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
I develop a static partial equilibrium model of employment choice that incorporates both
liquidity constraint and employee hiring choices. I then visualize the equilibrium of this
model by simulating it in Figure 4.1. The model shows that individuals who choose self-
employment are separated into two distinctive types: the ones with highest ability (opportu-
nity entrepreneurs) and the ones with the lowest (necessity entrepreneurs). The simulation
shows that the relaxation of credit constraint promote entrepreneurship, however, this effect
is significant for the opportunity entrepreneurs but trivial on necessity entrepreneurs.
In this model, individuals choose whether to be self-employed or work for a wage. Suppose
individuals differ in ability θ and wealth z, and they know their own ability before committing
to their occupational choices. Both θ and z are normalized to range between 0 and 1. I
assume that wage w and capital rent (i.e. one plus interest rate) r are exogenous.
4.3.0.1 Optimization for Self-Employers Self-employers choose the amount of capital
invested in the business and the number of employees to maximize their profit, given the level
of r and w. I assume the production function is in the form of g(θ)f(k, n) = eθkα(n + )β.
Individual’s ability θ affects productivity exponentially because of the “superstar” theory –
high ability entrepreneurs earn exponentially more than low ability entrepreneurs. k is the
amount of capital used and n is the number of “skill unit” hired. Entrepreneurs themselves
count as  unit of labor, so the total amount of labor is n+. Following Buera et al. (2013), α
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and β are the elasticities of output with respect to capital and labor and α+θ < 1, implying
diminishing returns to scale in variable factors at establishment level.
The self-employed workers face capital constraint similar as Evans and Jovanovic (1989).
Each person can borrow up to an amount that is proportional to his/her wealth: (λ−1)z, so
the most a person can invest in the business is z+ (λ− 1)z = λz. The 2007 Property Rights
law broadened the extent of collateral and improved the access to credit, thus increased λ.
To summarize, the optimization problem for self-employed workers is as follow:
max
k,n
eθkα(n+ )β + r(z − k)− wn (4.1)
s.t. 0 ≤ k ≤ λz, n ≥ 0 (4.2)
Note that k = 0 will never be the optimal choice for the entrepreneurs, so the constraint
k ≥ 0 will never bind. I can then derive the solution (k∗, n∗) to this maximizing problem in
four cases:
1. None of the constraints are binding, i.e. k∗ < λz, n∗ > 0:k
∗ = (α
1−βββ
r1−βwβ e
θ)
1
1−α−β
n∗ = (β
1−ααα
w1−αrα e
θ)
1
1−α−β − 
(4.3)
Solving the non-binding condition k∗ < λz and n∗ > 0 gives us the following inequalities:
k∗ < λz ⇔ θ < (1− α− β)ln(λz)− ln(α
1−βββ
r1−βwβ
) (4.4)
n∗ > 0⇔ θ > (1− α− β)ln()− ln(β
1−ααα
w1−αrα
) (4.5)
The intuition behind these two inequalities is that entrepreneurs will only hire employees
when their own ability θ is larger than a threshold value, and they will be unconstrained
in capital if their ability is relatively small compared to their wealth.
2. The constraint on labor binds but the constraint on capital does not:k
∗ = (α
β
r
eθ)
1
1−α
n∗ = 0
(4.6)
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3. The constraint on capital binds but the constraint on labor does not:
k
∗ = λz
n∗ = ( (λz)
αβ
w
eθ)
1
1−β − 
(4.7)
4. Both constraints are binding:
k
∗ = λz
n∗ = 0
(4.8)
Plugging (k∗, n∗) into the income structure equation, we can obtain the optimized income
for self-employed workers Y ∗SE:
Y ∗SE =

(1− α− β)(ααββ
rαwβ
eθ)
1
1−α−β + w+ rz if θ satisfies eq 4.4 and 4.5
(1− α)(α
r
)
α
1−α (βeθ)
1
1−α + rz if θ satisfies eq 4.4 but not 4.5
(1− β)( β
w
)
β
1−β ((λz)αeθ)
1
1−β + r(1− λ)z + w if θ satisfies eq 4.5 but not 4.4
(λz)αβeθ + r(1− λ)z if otherwise
(4.9)
4.3.0.2 Income for Wage-Earners For wage-earners, they get paid w based on their
skill as workers, and can get capital return on their endowment z. I assume that individuals’
skill as wage workers is the same as their ability θ. There is a probability P that they can not
find a job. I assume that this probability is a power function of their ability θ. This setting
allows me to incorporate the existence of “necessity entrepreneurs”. Some individuals will
gladly work for wages but could not find jobs with payment matching their expectation, so
they turn to self-employment out of necessity. The income structure for wage earners YW is
as below:
YW = P (θ)θw + rz = θ
τ+1w + rz (4.10)
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4.3.0.3 Optimal Occupational Choices Knowing their entrepreneurial income, in-
dividuals select into self-employment by comparing their optimal income as self-employed
workers Y ∗SE and as wage-earners YW . An individual will only choose to start a business if
and only if his/her expected income from doing so exceeds that from wage work:
eθ(k∗)α(n∗ + )β + r(z − k∗)− wn∗ ≥ θτ+1w + rz (4.11)
I analyze inequality 4.11 in four scenarios based on whether the capital constraint and hiring
constraint are binding. The occupational choices for individuals with ability θ and wealth z
are as below:
1. For individuals who do not subject to capital constraints and have high ability above the
threshold to hire employee(s), they choose self-employment if and only if the following
equations are satisfied:
(1− α− β)(ααββ
rαwβ
eθ)
1
1−α−β + w ≥ θτ+1w
θ ≥ (1− α− β)ln()− ln(β1−ααα
w1−αrα )
θ ≤ (1− α− β)ln(λz)− ln(α1−βββ
r1−βwβ )
(4.12)
2. For those who are unconstrained in capital but have low ability below the threshold to
hire employee(s), they choose self-employment if and only if the following equations are
satisfied: 
(1− α)(α
r
)
α
1−α (βeθ)
1
1−α ≥ θτ+1w
θ < (1− α− β)ln()− ln(β1−ααα
w1−αrα )
θ ≤ (1− α− β)ln(λz)− ln(α1−βββ
r1−βwβ )
(4.13)
3. For those who are constrained in capital but have high ability above the threshold to
hire employee(s), they choose self-employment if and only if the following equations are
satisfied: 
(1− β)( β
w
)
β
1−β ((λz)αeθ)
1
1−β − rλz + w ≥ θτ+1w
θ ≥ (1− α− β)ln()− ln(β1−ααα
w1−αrα )
θ > (1− α− β)ln(λz)− ln(α1−βββ
r1−βwβ )
(4.14)
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4. For those who are constrained in capital and have low ability below the threshold to
hire employee(s), they choose self-employment if and only if the following equations are
satisfied:

(λz)αβeθ − rλz ≥ θτ+1w
θ < (1− α− β)ln()− ln(β1−ααα
w1−αrα )
θ > (1− α− β)ln(λz)− ln(α1−βββ
r1−βwβ )
(4.15)
I simulate all four scenarios in a (θ, z) space, and plot them in Figure 4.1, which shows
the nature of selection.3 Two yellow parts represent individuals who chose self-employment
and subject to no capital constraint. Two blue parts are self-employed workers who are
capital constrained. The remaining white parts are wage workers.
When there is no capital constraint, i.e. λ =∞, there are only unconstrained individuals.
The solution simplified to θ ∈ (−∞, θ¯1] ∪ [θ¯2,∞), where θ¯1 and θ¯2 are the value of the two
solid red vertical lines in Figure 4.1. Thus, anyone with ability above θ¯2 or below θ¯1 will
choose self-employment, while others will chose to work for wage.
Although both high ability people and low ability people are potential self-employed
workers, they are different. The would-be self-employed individuals on the upper end (right
side) of the ability distribution hire employees, while the ones on the lower end (left side)
of the ability distribution do not hire employees. The results from this model is consistent
with models by Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) and Van Praag and Cramer (2001), among
the others, which link entrepreneurship to labor demand, predicting a positive relationship
between entrepreneurial ability and the number of employees they hire. The self-employed
workers with low ability choose self-employment because they have low probability of getting
a wage job, resulting in low expected wage earning. The self-employed workers with high
ability choose self-employment because they have high potential entrepreneurial earning.
Correspondingly, they are “necessity entrepreneurs” and “opportunity entrepreneurs”. This
separates my work from other labor market choice models.
3I assigned values to the parameters following Buera et al. (2013): α = 0.2, β = 0.59, r = 1.07, w = 1,
τ = 0.3, λ = 2
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Now consider a relaxing in credit constraint that λ increased by ∆λ. The blue lines in
Figure 4.2 shows the new occupational choices after this change. Some self-employers’ con-
straint become not binding; some wage workers choose to switch to self-employment because
they can borrow more and invest more which increase their potential entrepreneurial income.
The green shades mark the new self-employed workers after the relaxing of credit constraint:
the shade on the right corresponding to “opportunity entrepreneurs” is substantial, while
the shade on the left corresponding to “necessity entrepreneurs” is minimal. This is because
necessity entrepreneurs usually have very low ability so the amount of optimal capital they
required is limited.
Based on Figure 4.2, I have the following three propositions on the changes in self-
employment after credit constraint changes from λ to λ+ ∆λ:
Proposition 1. For the same ∆λ, the lower the initial λ, the higher the increase in the
self-employment rate.
Proposition 2. For the same λ, the higher the ∆λ, the higher the increase in the self-
employment rate.
Proposition 3. When λ increases, the increase in the rate of owner-manager is much larger
than the increase in the rate of own-account workers.
I test these three propositions by taking advantage of the passage of the 2007 Property
Rights in China, which broadened the extent of collateral which relaxes the credit constraint,
corresponding to an increase in λ in my model. I predict that a relaxing in credit constraint
will increase self-employment propensity, but it will affect opportunity entrepreneurs more
than necessity entrepreneurs.
4.4 DATA
4.4.1 Data Source
I utilize several different datasets: the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), the Chi-
nese Private Enterprises Survey (CPES), the National Economic Research Institute Marke-
77
tization Index (NERI Index), and data from the China Statistics Bureau.
I use five waves of the CHNS data: 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011. CHNS is a
nationally representative dataset that covers both urban and rural areas, collected by the
Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the
National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Center for Disease Control
and Prevention (Zhang et al., 2014). I exclude data from rural sites since our area of
focus is the urban labor market. Before 2011, this survey was conducted in nine provinces
including Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, and
Guizhou. In the 2011 wave, Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing were added. I exclude these
late additions from our analysis. CHNS is a panel dataset and the same individuals were
interviewed in each wave. The annual attrition rate is around 30% and new individuals
were added to maintain the representativeness of the sample (See Appendix C for a detailed
discussion on attrition and data representativeness).
Chinese Private Enterprises Survey (CPES) is a firm level dataset, conducted every two
year from 2000 to 2012 by the Privately Owned Enterprises Research Project Team. All
the subjects are owner-managers, and the dataset contains detailed information both on the
firm and on the personal background of the owner-manager.
The National Economic Research Institute Marketization Index is an extensively used
database containing the institutional index developed by the Nevin Economic Research In-
stitute to reflect the regional institutional environment (Fan et al., 2003, 2011). The index
is constructed annually for each province based on five aspects: relationship between gov-
ernment and market, development of non-state sector, development of commodity market,
development of factor market, and development of market intermediaries and legal environ-
ment. The index value ranges between 0 and 28, higher representing more market-oriented.
4.4.2 Two Different Types of Self-Employment
My model shows that one main distinction between the two types of self-employment is the
number of employees they hire. Thus, I differentiate urban self-employed workers into two
types based on whether they have paid employees: self-employed own-account workers and
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self-employed owner-managers. The former work on their own, while the latter have at least
one paid employees. Figure 4.3 presents the time trend of the self-employment rate in China
between 1989 and 2011 using all waves of CHNS data. Here, the self-employment rate is
defined as the proportion of these two types of self-employed individuals among all study
subjects in each wave. The percentage of self-employed owner-managers increased over time,
while the percentage of self-employed own-account workers reached a peak around 1997 then
started to decline after 2000.
I use education level as a crude indicator for individual’s ability, and plot the time trend
of average years of schooling for owner-manager and own-account workers in Figure 4.4,
along with their 95% confidence interval. Consistent with my model, there is a persistent
3-year gap in years of schooling among them, with own-account workers being less educated.
More analysis in Appendix E also shows that own-account workers are often not from well-
educated families and with low income. Own-account workers earned lower salary when
they were wage workers compared to the remaining wage earners. After their transition
into self-employment, their income decreased even further. For owner-mangers who were
salary workers in the past, there is no difference in their wage compared to the remaining
wage earners. After the transition, their income increased significantly. All evidence I found
are consistent with my theory and my model, suggesting that self-employed own-account
workers are “necessity entrepreneurs”, while self-employed owner-manger’s entrepreneurship
is an unconstrained choice.
Empirically, it is also natural to use the number of employees as the separation criteria for
different types of self-employment in China, since it is an important feature in the separation
of different enterprise categories: Getihu are private businesses that are registered with no
more than seven people hired as employees; Siyingqiye are those with more than seven
employees. Besides the difference in the maximum number of employees, Getihu also receives
more lenient policy regarding the assets they could use for running the firms (Zhang and
Van Stel, 2016).
This separation criterion is also used by Earle and Sakova (2000) in their analysis on six
former Soviet countries. They found that the own-account workers tend to be necessity en-
trepreneurs which characterized by negative traits, like low education, low household income
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and low family income. I can not deny that there might be some true entrepreneurs with no
employees, but my analysis provided in this paper shows that, this crude separation already
sheds light on the distinctive characteristics of different kinds of self-employment.4
4.4.3 Covariates
Guided by the literature on the empirical studies of entrepreneurship (Le (1999) etc.), I
control for various individual characteristics and provincial characteristics. Individual char-
acteristics include gender, age (and age squared), education (measured by years of school-
ing), marriage status (1 indicating married and 0 otherwise), individual annual income, and
whether the spouse works. I also test alternative indicators, such as using the level of com-
pleted education instead of using years of schooling, and the results are similar. Provincial
characteristics include regional gross domestic production (1000 USD), province population,
number of industrial enterprises above designated size, disposable income of urban residents,
total value of import and export from the region (1000 USD), and value added of the man-
ufacturing industry.
Summary statistics for different samples in CHNS are shown in Table 4.1. Consistent
with Figure 4.4 and Appendix E, own-account workers are the least educated and earn the
least amount of money.
4This is not the only separation criterion used in the literature. Levine and Rubinstein (2015) disag-
gregate the self-employed in the U.S. into incorporated and unincorporated. Their results suggest that the
incorporated ones are true entrepreneurs with distinctive cognitive and noncognitive traits, and they earn
much more per hour than their salaried and unincorporated counterparts. However, their criterion does
not suit developing countries. In the U.S., the self-employment rate is about 11%, a third of which are
incorporated. In the developing countries, the vast majority of self-employment are one man firms and the
number of incorporated ones are very small. What’s more, the legal system in most developing countries
are less complete, making it difficult to interpret the implication of being incorporated and unincorporated.
Mohapatra et al. (2007) evaluate the role of self-employment in China’s rural economy, separating the self-
employed into two types based on the level of capital invested in the self-employed business. They find that
the high productivity type is a sign of development while the low productivity type is a sign of distress. This
criterion is hard to apply here because of data restriction.
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4.5 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
4.5.1 Impact on Self-Employment Propensity
I intend to show the causal effect of credit constraint on self-employment propensity after the
passage of the 2007 Property Rights Law. Since different provinces can vary in their original
status of the financial market and the execution of the law, the degree of relaxation in credit
constraint due to the passage of the law can be different. Thus, I utilize a difference-in-
differences strategy by taking advantage of the provincial variations, measured by the NERI
Marketization Index.
I focus on three different dimensions of the NERI index that are directly related to the
collateral channel: credit market marketization level, financial marketization level, and the
protection of producers. Credit marketization level represents the share of loans to non-
state-owned businesses. Financial marketization level is a weighted average of the credit
marketization level and the competitiveness of the financial market. Protection of the pro-
ducers represents whether the local legal system execute the law justly.
Figure 4.5 shows the NERI marketization index on financial marketization level in 2007
and 2008 for the provinces in my sample. Using the model presented in Section 4.3, I
predict that: (1) Controlling for the change in NERI index, self-employment rate is higher
for provinces with tighter initial constraint in 2007, i.e. lower initial value in 2007; (2)
Controlling for 2007 NERI index, self-employment rate is higher for provinces with larger
increase in the NERI index; (3) The impact on owner-managers is larger than own-account
workers.
Empirically, I estimate the following two models: one with DID interaction terms of post
2007 indicator and the NERI index, and another with the interaction terms of post 2007
indicator and the change in the NERI index ∆NERI:
OwnAccountict = β10 + β11Postt + β12NERIc ∗ Postt + β13∆NERIc+
β14Xict + β15Provincect + β16Y eart + β17Cityit + 1
OwnerManagerict = β20 + β21Postt + β22NERIc ∗ Postt + β23∆NERIc+
β24Xict + β25Provincect + β26Y eart + β27Cityit + 2
(4.16)
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OwnAccountict = β30 + β31Postt + β32∆NERIc ∗ Postt + β33NERIc+
β34Xict + β35Provincect + β36Y eart + β37Cityit + 3
OwnerManagerict = β40 + β41Postt + β42∆NERIc ∗ Postt + β43NERIc+
β44Xict + β45Provincect + β46Y eart + β47Cityit + 4
(4.17)
where OwnAccountict and OwnerManagerict are indicators for individual i being own-
account workers or owner-manager in province c at year t. Post indicates after China’s
2007 Property Rights Law. NERIc is the marketization index for province c in 2007 and
∆NERIc is the change in NERI index from 2007 to 2009 for proince c. Xict and Provincect
are the individual characteristics and province characteristics introduced in Section ??. Year
fixed effect and city fixed effect are also included. Standard errors are clustered at the provin-
cial level.
If my model predictions are correct, β22 should be negative and β42 should be positive,
while β12 and β32 might be statistically insignificant. For necessity entrepreneurs, the policy
has less impact, thus I hypothesize β12 to be insignificant.
4.5.2 Impact through Collateral Channel
In order to verify that the effect indeed comes from the relaxation of credit constraint, I use
CPES data to create a binary index BankBorrow that represents this channel. Subjects
were asked whether they borrowed from the banks when starting their businesses. If the
answer is “yes” for owner-manager i who founded his/her business in year t in province c,
then BankBorrowict = 1; and 0 otherwise. I use BankBorrow as the outcome variable and
run a similar difference-in-differences model as below:
BankBorrowict = γ10 + γ11Postt + γ12NERIc ∗ Postt + γ13∆NERIc+
γ14Xict + γ15Provincect + γ16Y eart + γ17Cityit + 1
BankBorrowict = γ20 + γ21Postt + γ22∆NERIc ∗ Postt + γ23NERIc+
γ24Xict + γ25Provincect + γ26Y eart + γ27Cityit + 2
(4.18)
If the 2007 Property Law indeed relaxed the credit constraint and encouraged more en-
trepreneurs to borrow from the banks, provinces with lower initial NERI value and with
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larger increase in the NERI index should observe more increase in bank loans. Thus, γ12
should be negative and γ22 should be positive.
4.6 RESULTS
I utilized a difference-in-differences strategy in order to show the causal effect of credit con-
straint on self-employment propensity. Results for this model are reported in Table 4.2.
Three columns correspond to the three NERI indexes. In Panel A, the outcome variable is
OwnerManager, the indicator for being owner-manager. The coefficients for the interac-
tion terms Post ∗ NERI are all significantly negative, ranging from 1.23% to 2.24%. The
coefficients for the interaction terms Post ∗∆NERI, however, are all significantly positive.
This implies that the larger the relaxation in credit constraint, the larger the increase in
self-employment propensity for opportunity entrepreneurs. The results are consistent with
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. In Panel B, the coefficients for all the interaction terms are
not significant, suggesting that the law has little impact on own-account worker, consistent
with Proposition 3.
To verify that the channel is through the relaxation of credit constraint, another difference
-in-differences model is used and the results are reported in Table 4.3. As predict, the
coefficients are all negative on the interaction terms Post ∗ NERI and positive on Post ∗
∆NERI. This implies that the would-be owner-managers living in provinces with initial
worse credit market or provinces experienced larger expansion in credit market, borrowed
more from the banks after the 2007 Property Rights Law.
All the evidence suggest that the 2007 Property Rights Law improved the credit con-
straint, which promotes entrepreneurship represented by the amount of owner-manger in the
economy, but it has little impact on necessity entrepreneurs.
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4.7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper builds upon unique Chinese circumstances to explore the prevalence and origins of
different types of entrepreneurs, and how limited access to credit might impair them in differ-
ent ways. I distinguish and analyze two different types of self-employment in urban China—
opportunity entrepreneurship and necessity entrepreneurship. Opportunity entrepreneurs
are owner-managers who exploit business opportunities, hire workers, and promote overall
economic activity. Necessity entrepreneurs are individuals who turn to self-employment as a
last resort. I construct a structural model that contains both liquidity constraints and em-
ployee hiring choices to make predictions on the corresponding self-employment rates after a
relaxation of credit constraints. I test the predictions empirically, finding that the 2007 Prop-
erty Rights Law promotes entrepreneurship as measured by the number of owner-mangers
in the economy, but has little impact on necessity entrepreneurs. Studying the formerly
neglected distinction between “true entrepreneurs” and “entrepreneurs by default” opens
the door to more insightful analyses of enterprise formation that are valuable for China and
many other countries.
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Figure 4.1: Selection into Self-Employment
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Figure 4.2: Change in Credit Constraint
Note: The red lines represent the occupational choices under original credit constraint, and the blue lines
represent after relaxing the credit constraint. The green shades mark the new self-employed individual who
switch from wage workers.
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Figure 4.3: Self-Employment Rate (%): 1989-2011
Note: Self-employment rate for own-account worker is defined as the proportion of own-account workers
among all study subjects in each wave. Similarly, self-employment rate for owner-manager is the proportion
of owner-managers among all study subjects in each wave.
87
Figure 4.4: Gaps in Average Years of Schooling: 1989-2011
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Table 4.1: Summary Characteristics (1989-2011 Combined)
All Sample Salary Worker Own-account Manager
Female Ratio (%) 47.12 45.73 51.08 38.53
(49.92) (49.82) (49.99) (48.71)
Age (year) 40.29 39.97 41.14 38.92
(13.63) (13.50) (14.13) (11.00)
Education (year) 8.342 9.430 5.877 9.022
(4.365) (4.133) (3.920) (3.449)
Marriage Rate (%) 79.76 78.44 82.25 84.76
(40.18) (41.12) (38.21) (35.97)
Urban Hukou (%) 64.01 83.97 20.21 66.37
(48.00) (36.69) (40.16) (47.29)
Change Job (%) 12.49 15.23 5.509 21.28
(33.06) (35.93) (22.82) (40.98)
Annual Income (RMB) 8063.2 9044.4 4904.3 17717.4
(15570.0) (16123.1) (10815.3) (30849.5)
Annual HH Income (RMB) 20432.9 22844.9 13506.4 35638.0
(29733.2) (31538.2) (20601.4) (46782.1)
Work Hour (hour) 2205.3 2179.1 2259.8 2623.1
(616.2) (468.3) (1080.3) (793.8)
Spouse Has Job (%) 54.50 50.54 63.11 57.71
(49.80) (50.00) (48.25) (49.45)
Observations 20170 13568 6018 584
Notes: Mean values are reported, and standard deviations are in parenthesis. All samples are
for adult residents living in the urban areas.
89
Figure 4.5: NERI Financial Marketization Index in 2007 and 2008
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Table 4.2: Impact on Self-Employment Propensity
(1) (2) (3)
NERI Type Financial Market Credit Marketization Producer Protection
Panel A: Outcome is being owner-manager
Post*NERI -0.0209* -0.0224** -0.0123*
(0.0104) (0.00933) (0.00619)
Post*∆NERI 0.0345** 0.0439*** 0.0302***
(0.0126) (0.0129) (0.00649)
Panel B: Outcome is being own-account workers
Post*NERI 0.0332 -0.00608 0.0161
(0.0296) (0.0298) (0.0110)
Post*∆NERI 0.0107 -0.0283 -0.0117
(0.0613) (0.0452) (0.0236)
Observations 7,567 7,567 7,567
Notes: Each cell is a different regression. Standard errors are clustered at provincial
level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.3: Impact through Collateral Channel
(1) (2) (3)
Post*NERI -0.00828 -0.0144** -0.0213**
(0.0117) (0.00492) (0.00677)
Post*∆NERI 0.104*** 0.0369** 0.0171*
(0.0251) (0.0113) (0.00873)
NERI Type Financial Market Credit Marketization Producer Protection
Observations 1,493 1,493 1,493
Notes: The outcome is an index for whether borrowed from the banks when founding the
business. Each cell is a different regression. Standard errors are clustered at provincial
level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX A
CLUSTER V.S. BOOTSTRAP
Table A1: Robustness Checks for Standard Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Robust Cluster at Town Cluster at Village Bootstrap
Change in blood pressure -5.209** -5.209*** -5.209* -5.209**
(2.471) (1.560) (2.700) (2.355)
Age 0.0292 0.0292 0.0292 0.0292
(0.0428) (0.0402) (0.0498) (0.0456)
Female ratio 0.00168 0.00168 0.00168 0.00168
(0.00939) (0.00872) (0.00641) (0.00923)
Log(income-12) -0.801 -0.801 -0.801 -0.801
(0.692) (0.835) (0.776) (0.547)
Baseline Blood Pressure -0.378** -0.378*** -0.378** -0.378**
(0.160) (0.134) (0.181) (0.153)
Observations 541 541 541 541
Notes: Outcome variable is the percentage change in annual income (%). All regressions include
basic individual characteristics. The specification used is include health variables and exclude
town variables. Standard errors are not clustered in column (1), clustered at town level in column
(2), clustered at village level in column (3), and bootstrapped in column (4). Significance level:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX B
USING TWO INSTRUMENTS
This appendix section presents supplementary result using two instruments IV 1 and IV 2:
IV 1 = 1 if the individuals are treated by intervention 1, and IV 2 = 1 if the individuals are
treated by intervention 2. Specifically, we perform the following empirical analysis:
∆bpi = γ1 + γ2IV 1i + γ3IV 2i + γ4Xi + i (B.1)
∆LogInci = ρ1 + ρ2∆bpi + ρ3Xi + υi (B.2)
where X is a vector of variables including Cov, logInc12, and BP12. Robust standard errors
are clustered at village level.
Main results and placebo test results are reported in Table B1 and Table B2, which are
almost identical as the results using only one instrument.
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Table B1: IV Regressions Using Two Instruments
(2) (3) (4) (5)
IV IV IV IV
Sample: Not Disabled
Change in blood pressure -4.463*** -5.069*** -4.292*** -4.831***
(1.717) (1.962) (1.616) (1.817)
Age -0.00127 -0.00477 0.0188 0.0169
(0.0462) (0.0473) (0.0472) (0.0482)
Female ratio 0.00121 0.000701 0.00139 0.000738
(0.00611) (0.00644) (0.00623) (0.00656)
Log(income-12) -0.480 -0.384 -0.605 -0.526
(0.693) (0.662) (0.745) (0.721)
Baseline Blood Pressure -0.343*** -0.380*** -0.331*** -0.363***
(0.107) (0.125) (0.100) (0.114)
Observations 735 735 708 708
Include Health Variables No No Yes Yes
Include Town Variables No Yes No Yes
Sample: Farming
Change in blood pressure -6.557** -8.825** -6.394** -8.841**
(3.030) (4.116) (2.884) (3.786)
Age 0.0123 -0.0153 0.0110 -0.0164
(0.0626) (0.0707) (0.0623) (0.0753)
Female ratio 0.00437 0.00455 0.00212 0.00126
(0.0118) (0.0134) (0.0120) (0.0139)
Log(income-12) -0.306 -0.0888 -0.530 -0.316
(0.687) (0.704) (0.751) (0.782)
Baseline Blood Pressure -0.462** -0.621** -0.449** -0.615**
(0.217) (0.285) (0.217) (0.267)
Observations 566 566 541 541
Include Health Variables No No Yes Yes
Include Town Variables No Yes No Yes
Notes: Outcome variable is the percentage change in annual income
(%). All regressions include basic individual characteristics and use
PS weighting. “Health variables” include salt control, fat control, anti-
hypertension drug usage, and inpatient records. “Town variables” in-
clude the number of residents in the town and the distance from the
town to county seat. “Farming” refers to individuals who are engaged
in agriculture work. “Not Disabled” refers to individuals whose phys-
ical ability are not severely limited due to diseases. Robust standard
errors are clustered at village level. Significance level: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B2: Placebo Tests Using Two Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV IV IV IV
Sample: Disabled
Change in blood pressure -0.534 -2.521 -0.296 -2.575 -0.875
(0.548) (2.198) (2.138) (2.094) (2.069)
Age 0.0778 0.0992** 0.0897* 0.0885* 0.0799*
(0.0475) (0.0489) (0.0463) (0.0465) (0.0459)
Female ratio 0.0126 0.0148 0.0148 0.0117 0.0125
(0.0115) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0112)
Log(income-12) -0.424 0.0686 -0.438 0.0231 -0.422
(0.731) (0.782) (0.709) (0.737) (0.697)
Baseline Blood Pressure -0.157*** -0.283** -0.140 -0.287** -0.176
(0.0417) (0.129) (0.130) (0.124) (0.126)
Observations 331 342 331 342 331
Include Health Variable Yes No Yes No Yes
PS Weighting No No No Yes Yes
Sample: Not Farming
Change in blood pressure -0.404 0.0970 1.199 0.0969 1.062
(0.428) (1.336) (1.901) (1.236) (1.749)
Age 0.0552 0.0439 0.0527 0.0511 0.0547
(0.0400) (0.0471) (0.0466) (0.0380) (0.0373)
Female ratio 0.0114 0.0104 0.0127 0.0101 0.0129
(0.0107) (0.00928) (0.0108) (0.00970) (0.0113)
Log(income-12) 0.109 0.357 0.0767 0.346 0.106
(0.502) (0.579) (0.460) (0.603) (0.487)
Baseline Blood Pressure -0.117*** -0.107 -0.0308 -0.109 -0.0403
(0.0404) (0.0778) (0.114) (0.0698) (0.102)
Observations 498 511 498 511 498
Include Health Variable Yes No Yes No Yes
PS Weighting No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Outcome variable is the percentage change in annual income (%). All re-
gressions include basic individual characteristics and use PS weighting. “Health
variables” include salt control, fat control, anti-hypertension drug usage, and
inpatient records. “Town variables” include the number of residents in the town
and the distance from the town to county seat. “Farming” refers to individu-
als who are engaged in agriculture work. “Not Disabled” refers to individuals
whose physical ability are not severely limited due to diseases. Robust standard
errors are clustered at village level. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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APPENDIX C
DATA DISCUSSION
We use five waves of the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) data: 2000, 2004, 2006,
2009, and 2011. It is a panel dataset and individuals were interviewed in each wave. Due
to attrition, new individuals were added to maintain the representativeness of the sample.
91.37% of the observations appeared in more than one wave, and 38.57% appeared in all five
waves, as shown in Figure C1. The annual attrition rate is around 23%, which is high relative
to U.S. datasets. I show in Table C1 the comparative statistics for individual characteristics
between consecutive waves. The value reported is the mean value for the baseline year, and
the significance level is for the t-test comparison between the baseline year and the next
consecutive wave. For example, column (1) reports the mean values for observations in the
2000 wave, and the comparison is between 2000 wave and 2004 wave. Besides 2000 wave,
the other waves all look very similar, thus the representativeness of the sample is generally
maintained.
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Figure C1: Frequency of Appearance in Five CHNS Waves
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Table C1: Comparative Statistics for Different CHNS Waves
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2000 vs 2004 2004 vs 2006 2006 vs 2009 2009 vs 2011
Age (year) 39.45** 40.62* 41.62 41.97
Female Share (%) 46.93 45.10 44.14 42.63
Education (year) 8.72*** 9.79 9.98 10.14
Marriage Rate (%) 79.78** 83.74 85.48 84.16
Poor Health (%) 11.14*** 21.26*** 16.40 16.88
Log(Income) 7.65 7.58*** 8.07*** 8.88
Spouse Works (%) 66.06*** 59.32 60.14* 56.13
Urban Hukou 0.60*** 0.68* 0.64 0.65
Senior Professional (%) 6.47 7.78 8.17 8.28
Junior Professional (%) 6.69 6.40 6.00 6.52
Administrator (%) 7.23* 9.56 8.50 7.56
Office Staff (%) 8.42 8.51 9.95 10.76
Skilled Worker (%) 11.92 11.74 9.82 10.56
Non-skilled Worker (%) 9.62 11.08 12.46 11.41
Police or Army (%) 1.11 0.79 0.33 0.46
Driver (%) 2.97* 4.35 4.61 3.91
Service Worker (%) 11.30 12.40* 15.29 17.47**
Notes: The value reported is the mean value for the baseline year, and the significance level
is for the t-test comparison between the baseline year and the next consecutive wave. For
example, column (1) reports the mean values for observations in the 2000 wave, and the
comparison is between the 2000 wave and the 2004 wave. Significance level: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX D
ALTERNATIVE EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
In order to rule out the possibility that the relative increase in self-employment rate for
urban Hukou is driven by other events, instead of the implementation of URBMI, we present
here an alternative empirical strategy. We focus on the transition from a salaried position
to self-employment among urban Hukou residents, separately during the periods before and
after the implementation of URBMI. We use a difference-in-differences model to identify
that job lock existed before 2009, and then another one after 2009 to show that job lock
disappeared after the implementation of URBMI.
We observe in Table 3.1 that before the implementation of URBMI, the transition rate
for urban Hukou residents is much higher for individuals with employer-provided health in-
surance compared to those without. In this section, we estimate the entrepreneurship barrier
using a difference-in-differences strategy following Holtz-Eakin et al. (1996) and Fairlie et al.
(2011): comparing the effect of employment-based insurance on self-employment transition
rate between those with low and high demand for the employment-based health insurance.
The most commonly used indicator in the literature to measure the demand for employer-
provided health insurance is whether employees’ spouses have insurance coverage that can
cover workers.1 However, China’s employer-provided insurance program, UEBMI, does not
cover employees’ spouse and children, thus spouse’s insurance coverage can not be used
1Other indicators used in the literature, like having a pregnant wife, having family member in poor health,
and having a large family, usually failed to generate significant results. We used these indicators as well.
The point estimations are as predicted, but not significant. Thus we will not report these results here.
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to measure the demand for employment-based health insurance in China. Instead, we use
whether an individual has non-employment based insurance as the indicator. If a wage-
worker has non-employment based insurance plans, he/she may have lower demand for
employer-provided health insurance, compared to those who do not have non-employment
based insurance. The effect of employer-based insurance on transitions to self-employment
can be confounded by job quality, but by taking the difference of the differences between
individuals with and without non-employment based insurance, we can mitigate this endo-
geneity. Among individuals with employer-provided health insurance in our sample, 17.6%
had supplemental non-employment based insurance. Among individuals without employer-
provided health insurance, 31.6% had non-employment based insurance. In China, the most
common non-employment based health insurance before the implementation of URBMI was
commercial insurance. In our sample, 72.7% of individuals with non-employment based
insurance in the pre-policy period had commercial insurance.
Empirically, we estimate the following model for pre-policy (t < 2009) and post-policy
(t ≥ 2009) respectively:
1[NewSelf ]it = β
pre
0 + β
pre
1 1[EI]it + β
pre
2 1[HD]it + β
pre
3 (1[EI]it · 1[HD]it)+
βpre4 Xit + γ
pre
t + τ
pre
c + 
pre
it , t < 2009
1[NewSelf ]it = β
post
0 + β
post
1 1[EI]it + β
post
2 1[HD]it + β
post
3 (1[EI]it · 1[HD]it)+
βpost4 Xit + γ
post
t + τ
post
c + 
post
it , t ≥ 2009
(D.1)
where 1[NewSelf ]it = 1 indicates a transition from a wage-earner in wave t to an en-
trepreneur in wave t + 1, and 1[EI]it = 1 indicates individual i have employment-based
health insurance in wave t. 1[HD]it = 1 indicates having a high demand for employer-
provided health insurance in wave t, defined as not having supplementary non-employment-
based insurance in wave t. The interaction term (1[EI]it ·1[HD]it) provides the difference-in-
differences estimator. The other aspects of the model are similar to equation 3.1. Negative
coefficients of the interaction term (βpre3 and β
post
3 ) are consistent with the notion of en-
trepreneurship lock.
In an ideal world where non-employment based health insurance is randomly assigned,
this difference-in-differences strategy can give us an accurate estimation of entrepreneurship
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lock. However, in our case, the assignment of individuals with and without non-employment
based insurance plan is not a random mechanism. Individuals with and without non-
employment based insurance can differ in health status, risk preference, and wealth, all
of which can affect their labor market decisions. We conducted t-test and presented the
comparative statistics of these variables in the pre-policy period in Table D1 Panel A. In
general, there are no significant differences in key characteristics between individuals with
and without non-employment based health insurance, except for the indicator for whether
a spouse has a job, the dummy for being a senior professional, and the dummy for being
a service worker. Nevertheless, we discuss below three potential concerns of violating the
random assignment assumption and how it may affect our estimation strategy.
First, individuals can differ in health condition, and it is possible that those who pur-
chased non-employment based health insurance have worse health than those who did not
purchase additional insurance. We compared the health indicators discussed above between
those with and without non-employment based insurance and did not find statistically sig-
nificant differences. We acknowledge that there may be unobserved differences in health
conditions. However, if workers with non-employment based health insurance had worse
health status than those without, we would underestimate the effect of employment-based
insurance on job lock. In particular, individuals with poor health are less mobile, thus less
likely to transition into self-employment. But those with supplementary non-employment
based insurance have low demand for employment-based insurance and are therefore not
as subject to job lock as those without supplementary health insurance. That is, the po-
tential selection, if any, works opposite direction as the main effect, and therefore it could
underestimate the effect.
Second, individuals with more insurance might be more risk-averse than those with less
insurance. We use the usage of cigarette and alcohol as an indicator of risk preference. Heavy
drinkers and heavy smokers are usually more reckless, thus less risk averse. We categorize
risk aversion by identifying whether an individual smokes more than 20 cigarettes per day,
or drink more than 10 bottles of beer or 1 liter of liquor each week. We conducted a t-test
to compare this risk aversion indicator and did not find statistically significant difference
between those with and without non-employment based insurance (30.90% vs 26.66%; p-
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value of 0.12). Even if risk preference matters, workers with alternative non-employment
based insurance are more risk averse and should value their employer-provided insurance
more. This is again the opposite direction as our theory proposed, so our estimation can be
considered as a conservative estimation.
Third, individuals with non-employment insurance may be richer than those without this
insurance. It is unclear how wealth affects transition rates to self-employment. On one hand,
it’s easier for richer people to break the barrier to become entrepreneurs because they have
more money. On the other hand, a high wage also means a high opportunity cost to leave
the current jobs. Nevertheless, there is no statistically significant difference in the logarithm
of annual wage and household income between those with non-employment based insurance
and those without such insurance.
In sum, we do not observe significant differences in main characteristics between individ-
uals with and without non-employment based health insurance, except for three indicators,
one for having working spouses and the other two for being senior professionals or service
workers. To further balance the two groups, we also utilize the propensity score method
with an inverse probability of treatment weighting (PS Weights). The weighted character-
istics for each group are reported in Panel B of Table D1. After using PS weights, all key
characteristics are balanced.
We report estimation results with and without PS weights in Table D2, with pre-policy
regressions in column (1)-(2) and post-policy regressions in column (3)-(4). Before URBMI
was implemented, for the overall population, having a high demand for employer-provided
health insurance increases the difference in the rates of transition to self-employment between
individuals with and without employer-provided health insurance by 7.65 percentage points,
or 151% compared to the baseline transition rate. For male workers, the effect is robust
but larger. In the post-policy period, not only do some coefficients become positive, but
the standard errors are also much larger. This finding suggests that there is no evidence of
entrepreneurship lock after the implementation of URBMI. The existence of entrepreneurship
lock in the pre-policy period and its disappearance in the post-policy period also imply
that the non-employment based health insurance alleviated the job lock, and succeeded in
establishing individual coverage as a legitimate alternative to employer-sponsored coverage.
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Table D1: Comparative Statistics for Individuals with and Without Non-Employment In-
surance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
With NEBI Without NEBI Difference Count
Panel A: Without PS Weights
Age (year) 40.48 39.72 0.76 1488
Female Share (%) 43.15 40.85 2.30 1491
Education (year) 11.07 11.30 -0.24 1378
Marriage Rate (%) 85.76 84.91 0.84 1477
Poor Health (%) 14.29 14.98 -0.70 1491
Spouse Has Job (%) 66.47 60.98 5.50* 1491
Log(Annual Income) 8.94 8.81 0.13 1491
Share as Senior Professional (%) 18.13 14.04 4.09* 1489
Share as Service Worker (%) 5.85 10.99 -5.14** 1489
Panel B: With PS Weights
Age (year) 40.39 40.21 0.18 1488
Female Share (%) 40.76 41.29 -0.53 1491
Education (year) 11.15 11.23 -0.07 1378
Marriage Rate (%) 84.88 85.16 -0.28 1477
Poor Health (%) 16.54 15.90 0.64 1491
Spouse Has Job (%) 61.24 62.47 -1.23 1491
Log(Annual Income) 8.88 8.59 0.29 1491
Share as Senior Professional (%) 14.09 14.72 -0.63 1489
Share as Service Worker (%) 10.98 10.40 0.58 1489
Notes: (1) Column (1) are for individuals with non-employment based insurance (with NEBI),
which represents low demand for employer-provided insurance. Column (2) represents high
demand. (2) We only report the t-test results for two of the seven major occupational dummies
in this table, since the results for the others are all insignificant even without PS weights. (3)
Panel A reports results without the inverse probability of treatment weighting. Panel B reports
results with it. (4) Significance level in t-test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table D2: Alternative Strategy: Existence of Entrepreneurship Lock
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-policy Post-policy
HaveEmpIns*HighDemand with PS Weights -0.0765* -0.113** -0.0343 -0.0871
(0.0424) (0.0474) (0.0924) (0.115)
HaveEmpIns*HighDemand -0.0665** -0.0953** 0.0712 0.0406
(0.0338) (0.0427) (0.0622) (0.123)
Observations 1,334 786 498 303
Dependent Mean 0.0507 0.0582 0.0456 0.0493
Sample All Male All Male
Notes: (1) This table reports the treatment effects of the interaction term (HaveEmploy-
erIns*HighDemand, i.e. having employer-provided health insurance and having high demand
for this insurance), with and without inverse probability of treatment weights (PS Weights). The
dependent variable 1[NewSE] = 1 indicates transition from a wage-earner in current wave to
an entrepreneur in the next wave. (2) All specifications include year and city fixed effects. (3)
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX E
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TWO TYPES OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT
I analyze the characteristics of the two types of self-employment–own-account workers and
owner-managers. I examine their income profile and address the selection in the occupa-
tional choice. I separate the population into three categories: wage earners, self-employed
own-account workers, and self-employed owner-managers. I found that: (1) Under a multi-
nomial logistic model, own-account workers and self-employed owner-managers show vastly
different characteristics. The former are often not well educated, not from well-educated
families, and with low income. On the opposite, the owner-managers are richer and come
from more educated families. (2) Using a similar method as Hamilton (2000), I found that
own-account workers earned lower salary when they were wage workers compared to the
remaining wage earners. After their transition into self-employment, their income decreased
even further. For owner-mangers who were salary workers in the past, there is no differ-
ence in their wage compared to the remaining wage earners. After the transition, their
income increased significantly. Both findings are evidence that self-employed own-account
workers’ entrepreneurship reflects some distress or survival necessity, while self-employed
owner-manger’s entrepreneurship is an unconstrained choice.
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E.1 A MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC MODEL
I utilize a multinomial logit model, and particularly focus on characteristics that tent to
associate with either the “necessity entrepreneur view” or the “opportunity entrepreneur
view”– education, family background, and household income. I further conduct pooling
tests for the differences across the categories, which suggests that the difference within self-
employment sectors is even bigger than the difference between sectors.
The multinomial logit model uses salary workers as the baseline category.
log
Pijt
PiWt
= αj + βjXit + γ1jCityit + γ2jY earit + ijt (E.1)
Pijt stands for the probability that person i is own-account self-employed worker (j = 1), or
self-employed owner manager (j = 2) at time t, and PiWt denotes the probability that the
person is a wage worker in time t. Xit is a vector of regressors that includes demographics
(age, age square, gender, marriage status), years of schooling, the average number of hours
worked per year, whether have health insurance, occupational status, log of household in-
come, log of individual income, and parents’ education status. City and year fixed effects
are included.
I also estimated similar model using characteristics of the previous wave since there are
concerns that current occupational status is determined by previous characteristics (denoted
in Table E2 as with time lag):
log
Pijt
PiWt
= αj + βjXi,t−1 + γ1jCityit + γ2jY earit + ijt (E.2)
Results for the marginal effect are reported in Table E2, showing significant differences
among each group. For own-account workers, the coefficients on own education, Hukou sta-
tus, household income, individual income, and health insurance status are all significantly
negative. This means that compared to salary workers, they are less educated, poorer, rural
Hukou and no health insurance. Thus individuals associated with disadvantaged characteris-
tics are more likely to become own-account workers. For owner-managers, although they are
more likely to be less educated and have no health insurance, they have higher household
income. The effect for each covariates is also smaller. For example, when I increase one
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year of school, my probability of being own-account workers decreases by 0.24%, and my
probability of becoming owner-manager only decreases by 0.12%. The results are robust for
city residents with urban Hukou.
I further conduct Cramer-Ridder pooling test to check whether the differences between
each category in the previous multinomial logit model are significant. The null hypothesis
is that the two states have the same regressors coefficient apart from the intercept.1 Results
in Table E1 show that this hypothesis (prob(P > χ2) = 0.000) is rejected for every group,
i.e. the three categories are very different from each other. What is phenomenal is that the
biggest difference is between own-account workers and owner-managers. This means that
the difference within self-employment sectors ( own-account workers v.s. owner-managers)
is even bigger than the difference between sectors (employee v.s. self-employment).
E.2 INCOME PROFILE AND SELECTION
Figure E1 shows the distribution of annual individual income (1989-2011 combined). We
can see that the income of own-account workers is the lowest, and owner-managers earn at
least the same amount as salary workers. I further plot the income distribution for each year
in Figure E2. The annual income increased over the years, but the patterns are similar for
every year: own-account workers earn the least, and owner-managers earn at least the same
amount as salary workers.
However, the differences in income can come from differences in return to self-employment
or it can come from selection of individuals into different sectors. Here, I use a similar strategy
as in Hamilton (2000) to show that selection plays an important role in the income difference
between sectors in urban China. I find that individuals who transit from salary workers to
own-account workers have lower income compared to the remaining salary workers. Their
income decreases further after the transition. These two findings indicate that own-account
1To test this hypothesis, the following test statistics can be used: LR = 2(lnL− lnLr) where lnL is the
maximum log likelihood of the original model and lnLr the maximum log likelihood, if the estimates are
constrained to be equal. LR asymptotically has a chi-square distribution with k degrees of freedom where k
is the number of restrictions implied.
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workers’ productivity is low in both wage sector and self-employed sector, which further
rejects that own-account workers are true entrepreneurs.
In order to emphasize selection, I compare the population who transitioned from wage
earners in one wave to self-employment with individuals who remain to be employees. I
define the transition rate as the proportion of wage-earners in one wave who became new
own-account workers (or new owner-managers) in the next consecutive wave. This is done
for each two-wave panels: 1989-1991, 1991-1993, 1993-1997, 1997-2000, 2000-2004, 2004-
2006, 2006-2009, and 2009-2011. I also add another category–unemployed individuals–to
help illustrate the results. Transition rate within different employment status are shown in
Table E3 and summary statistics for individuals with different transition status are shown
in Table E4. From Table E3, we can see that 87.99% of original wage-earners remain as
wage-earners, 7.69% transition to be own-account workers and 1.74% transition to be self-
employed owner-managers. Based on the mean annual income in the summary statistics,
workers remaining in paid employment earn much more than those who transit to be own-
account workers (7076 v.s. 4677 RMB), but lower than the would-be entrepreneurs prior to
entering self-employment (7076 v.s. 8905 RMB).
To further examine the statistical significance of this relationship, I implement a post-
program estimator as in Hamilton (2000). In particular, I estimate wage regressions for
paid employees including a dummy variable that indicating their sector status in the next
consecutive wave:
logwageit = α
1
0 + α
1
1OwnAccountNextit + β1Xit + γ1Cityit + η1Y earit + it (E.3)
logwageit = α
2
0 + α
2
1ManagerNextit + β2Xit + γ2Cityit + η2Y earit + it (E.4)
logwageit = α
3
0 + α
3
1UnemployNextit + β3Xit + γ2Cityit + η3Y earit + it (E.5)
UnemployNextit, OwnAccountNextit and ManagerNextit equals 1 if the individual tran-
sitions from a salary worker in wave t to unemployed/own-account worker/owner-manager
in wave t + 1, and equals 0 if remaining to be a salary worker. I use two measures for the
dependent variable log of wage income: log of hourly wage and log of annual wage. Xit is a
vector of individual characteristics in wave t. City and year fixed effects are included.
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Results are shown in Table E5. The coefficients of ManagerNextit are insignificant, while
the coefficients of OwnAccountNextit and UnemployNextit are significantly negative. This
means that those who transit to be own-account workers or become unemployed originally
earn much less salary than the remaining wage-earners. The would-be owner-managers
originally had about the same amount of salary income as the workers remaining in paid
employment. The patterns are consistent whether using annual wage or hourly wage as
dependent variables, and whether for the overall population or for urban Hukou only. If
wage can be considered as an indicator for labor productivity in the wage sector, then the
new own-account workers are the less productive original employees. Notice that the wage
distribution of own-account workers are very similar to the unemployed, it is very likely the
new own-account workers turn to self-employment because they were forced out of the main
sector.
However, this still cannot prove that these new own-account workers choose self-employ-
ment out of survival necessity, since self-employment can require different skills than being
employees. A lousy employee might be a good entrepreneur. Thus, I check the changes in
income after people change sectors. More specifically, I estimate the following model:
∆log(Incomeit) = α
j
1
∑
Transittypejit + β1Xit + γ1Cityit + η1Y earit +  (E.6)
∆log(HourIncit) = α
j
2
∑
Transittypejit + β2Xit + γ2Cityit + η2Y earit +  (E.7)
Change in log of annual income (∆log(Incomeit)) and change in log of hourly income
(∆log(HourIncit)) are used as dependent variables. Transittype
j
it is a set of dummy variable
for individual i with different transition types j from wave t to wave t+1: from wage earner to
own-account worker, from wage earner to owner-manager, from own-account worker to wage
earner, from own-account worker to owner-manager, from owner-manager to wage earner,
and from owner-manager to own-account worker.
Results are reported in Table E6. The first two rows reveal a clear pattern: compared to
remaining wage earners, individuals’ income decreased (or increased less) after changing jobs
from salary workers to own-account self-employers, while individuals’ income increased more
after changing jobs from salary workers to self-employed owner-managers. ∆log(Incomeit)
is centered around 0.303 (sd = 1.2), and ∆log(HourIncit) has a mean of 0.334 (sd = 0.98).
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Thus magnitude wise, the differences in income changes among different transition types are
not trivial.
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Figure E1: Income Distribution (1989-2011 Combined)
Note: This graph shows the overall annual income distribution of self-employed owner-managers, self-
employed own-account workers, and wage earners. Annual income is measured in RMB.
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Figure E2: Income Distribution by Year
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Table E1: Cramer-Ridder Test
lnL lnLr LR P > χ2
Own-account vs Owner-Manager -4949 -7975 6051 0.000
Own-account vs Salary Worker -4949 -5164 428 0.000
Owner-manager vs Salary Worker -4949 -5170 441 0.000
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Table E2: Marginal Effect of Multinomial Logit Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own-account Owner-manager Own-account Owner-manager Own-account Owner-manager
Education -0.00239*** -0.00120* -0.00166** -0.00128* -0.00516*** -0.000477
(0.000675) (0.000630) (0.000715) (0.000666) (0.00112) (0.000684)
Age 0.00147 0.000388 0.000813 -0.000944 -0.00199 0.00198
(0.00136) (0.00121) (0.00151) (0.00123) (0.00215) (0.00158)
AgeSq -1.41e-05 -9.07e-06 -7.16e-06 4.76e-06 3.74e-05 -2.78e-05
(1.56e-05) (1.42e-05) (1.75e-05) (1.42e-05) (2.50e-05) (1.91e-05)
Urban Hukou -0.0277*** -0.00529 -0.0859*** -0.00393
(0.00517) (0.00402) (0.00813) (0.00480)
Female -0.00892* -0.00133 -0.00388 -0.000108 -0.00280 -0.00957**
(0.00459) (0.00351) (0.00455) (0.00370) (0.00718) (0.00435)
Insurance -0.0365*** -0.0330*** -0.0340*** -0.0344*** -0.0705*** -0.0289***
(0.00505) (0.00395) (0.00486) (0.00426) (0.00798) (0.00474)
Log(Ind Income) -0.00216 0.0107*** -0.00193 0.0105* 0.00120 0.00144
(0.00197) (0.00403) (0.00212) (0.00537) (0.00179) (0.00153)
Annual Work Hour 1.95e-05*** 1.69e-05*** 2.39e-05*** 1.73e-05*** 1.97e-05*** 7.70e-06***
(2.75e-06) (2.26e-06) (3.10e-06) (2.79e-06) (4.07e-06) (2.44e-06)
Married 0.0172 -0.0106 0.00516 -0.00682 -0.0105 0.00753
(0.0127) (0.0101) (0.0134) (0.00981) (0.0188) (0.0120)
Parent Self-emp 0.0136 0.00753 0.0248 0.0118 -0.00993 0.00180
(0.0134) (0.0104) (0.0152) (0.0117) (0.0199) (0.0118)
Parent Education -0.0178* 0.00856 -0.0279*** 0.0162** -0.0474** 0.0269***
(0.0103) (0.00663) (0.0101) (0.00734) (0.0193) (0.00849)
Spouse Has Job 0.0222*** 0.00199 0.0133** -0.00274 0.0203** -0.000585
(0.00587) (0.00429) (0.00543) (0.00449) (0.0104) (0.00543)
Observations 11,398 11,398 8,662 8,662 7,622 7,622
Time Lag No No No No Yes Yes
Hukou Urban Urban
Notes: Base Category is Salary Worker. Marginal effect is reported. Time and city fixed effect are added. Signifi-
cance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table E3: Transition Rate within Employment Status (%): 1989-2011 Combined
Employment Status Next Wave
Unemployed Salary Worker OwnAccount OwnerManager Total
Unemployed 26.6 52.39 15.43 5.59 100
Salary Worker 2.59 87.99 7.69 1.74 100
Own-account 2.08 16.25 78.64 3.02 100
Owner-manager 5.35 39.46 28.09 27.09 100
Total Percent 4.06 62.34 31.18 2.42 100
Total Count 668 10,265 5,134 398 16,465
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Table E4: Summary Statistics for Different Transition Status
Individual Income Annual Work Hour Age Education
remain salary 7076.25 2057.36 39.23 9.43
salary to ownaccount 4577.34 2078.31 38.02 6.86
salary to manager 8905.28 2133.32 38.23 9.10
remain ownaccount 3586.00 1898.60 40.44 5.30
ownaccount to salary 5139.61 1884.65 36.74 7.19
ownaccount to manager 6569.99 2354.14 36.51 7.64
remain manager 15127.43 2729.14 38.23 9.26
manager to salary 9256.94 2382.80 37.27 8.79
manager to ownaccount 14212.81 2561.08 38.07 8.12
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Table E5: Self-Selection with Post-Program Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome Variable: Log(Hourly Wage)
Own-account -0.145*** -0.130***
(0.0402) (0.0488)
Owner-manager -0.0422 -0.0127
(0.0646) (0.0728)
Unemployed -0.152*** -0.17***
(0.0579) (0.062)
Education 0.0241*** 0.024*** 0.0236*** 0.0227*** 0.0224*** 0.022***
(0.00287) (0.0029) (0.00287) (0.00306) (0.00309) (0.0031)
Age 0.0356*** 0.031*** 0.0329*** 0.0394*** 0.0370*** 0.039***
(0.00581) (0.0059) (0.00582) (0.00632) (0.00630) (0.0062)
Female -0.133*** -0.14*** -0.132*** -0.126*** -0.133*** -0.13***
(0.0165) (0.017) (0.0167) (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.017)
Married 0.126*** 0.121*** 0.111*** 0.123*** 0.116*** 0.11**
(0.0398) (0.040) (0.0397) (0.0422) (0.0424) (0.042)
Recent Change Job -0.237*** -0.215*** -0.216*** -0.215*** -0.207*** -0.21***
(0.0366) (0.0377) (0.0373) (0.0392) (0.0397) (0.039)
Parent Education -0.0316 -0.0389 -0.0481 -0.0158 -0.000619 -0.0055
(0.0399) (0.0394) (0.0392) (0.0417) (0.0420) (0.042)
Spouse Has Job 0.0432 0.0443 0.0411 0.0301 0.0423 0.034
(0.0313) (0.0318) (0.0319) (0.0324) (0.0327) (0.033)
Outcome Variable: Log(Annual Wage)
Own-account -0.104*** -0.110**
(0.0391) (0.0491)
Owner-manager -0.0447 -0.0291
(0.0579) (0.0586)
Unemployed -0.167** -0.15***
(0.0653) (0.057)
Education 0.0253*** 0.0262*** 0.0256*** 0.0250*** 0.0248*** 0.025***
(0.00309) (0.00312) (0.00312) (0.00341) (0.00341) (0.0034)
Age 0.0462*** 0.0443*** 0.0464*** 0.0529*** 0.0515*** 0.054***
(0.00616) (0.00628) (0.00639) (0.00679) (0.00681) (0.0068)
Female -0.155*** -0.162*** -0.162*** -0.150*** -0.158*** -0.16***
(0.0166) (0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0176) (0.0177) (0.018)
Married 0.0978** 0.0941** 0.0774** 0.0991** 0.0942** 0.086**
(0.0387) (0.0386) (0.0395) (0.0413) (0.0413) (0.041)
Recent Change Job -0.200*** -0.188*** -0.183*** -0.182*** -0.179*** -0.19***
(0.0345) (0.0354) (0.0354) (0.0366) (0.0367) (0.036)
Parent Education -0.0418 -0.0548 -0.0600 -0.0360 -0.0269 -0.026
(0.0383) (0.0382) (0.0393) (0.0404) (0.0407) (0.040)
Spouse Has Job 0.0192 0.0208 0.0194 0.00460 0.0120 0.0099
(0.0299) (0.0305) (0.0307) (0.0317) (0.0318) (0.032)
Observations 5,913 5,693 5,715 5,067 4,993 5,009
Sample All All All UrbanHukou UrbanHukou UrbanHukou
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table E6: Differences in the Change of Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆log(Income) ∆log(HourlyIncome) ∆log(Income) ∆log(HourlyIncome)
wage to ownaccount -0.248*** -0.109 -0.112 0.0523
(0.0776) (0.0744) (0.114) (0.101)
wage to manager 0.340** 0.133 0.423*** 0.204*
(0.135) (0.0989) (0.163) (0.105)
ownaccount to wage 0.101 0.0738 0.131 0.0179
(0.0870) (0.0844) (0.106) (0.0951)
ownaccount to manager 0.202 -0.00957 0.184 0.149
(0.166) (0.164) (0.203) (0.183)
manager to wage -0.251** -0.137 -0.310** -0.177*
(0.0984) (0.0871) (0.123) (0.103)
manager to ownaccount -0.892*** -0.281 -0.922*** -0.433
(0.223) (0.202) (0.305) (0.311)
Education 0.00685 0.00595 0.00368 0.00656*
(0.00422) (0.00383) (0.00388) (0.00380)
Age -0.0243*** -0.0195*** -0.0210*** -0.0126*
(0.00745) (0.00755) (0.00736) (0.00748)
Urban Hukou 0.0995** 0.0915**
(0.0392) (0.0364)
Female -0.0342 -0.0201 -0.0184 -0.0246
(0.0235) (0.0215) (0.0206) (0.0209)
Married -0.0497 -0.0532 -0.0476 -0.0392
(0.0591) (0.0504) (0.0516) (0.0513)
Recent Change Job -0.0288 -0.0231 -0.0401 -0.0336
(0.0462) (0.0487) (0.0475) (0.0491)
Parent Education -0.0511 -0.0260 -0.0109 -0.0298
(0.0563) (0.0516) (0.0577) (0.0505)
Spouse Has Job -0.0261 -0.0223 -0.0698* -0.0688*
(0.0420) (0.0399) (0.0421) (0.0404)
Observations 7,000 6,501 5,637 5,294
Sample All All Urban Hukou Urban Hukou
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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